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MORTON HORWITZ AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
WYTHE HOLT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The publication in 1977 of Morton Horwitz's The Transforma-
tion of American Law 1780-18601 was a signal event for American
legal historians. Prefigured by the appearance of some of its chap-
ters in the preceding several years2-chapters whose promise "daz-
zled" 3 many of us who were entering the field during that
time-and culminating what appeared to be a burst of energy and
enthusiasm in an area previously arid, antiquarian, oriented to-
ward the colonial era, and relatively unpopulated with sound schol-
ars, the book seemed at long last to herald a fresh and progressive
"field theory' 4 with which to approach the study of American legal
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. B.A., Amherst College; J.D., Ph.D., University
of Virginia. An earlier version of this essay was read at a faculty seminar at Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, on March 12, 1979. Several of my colleagues and friends gen-
erously have given criticism and moral support indispensable for the completion of this es-
say: Peter d'Errico, Jay Feinman, Harry Glasbeek, Fred Konefsky, L.H. LaRue, Michael
Mandel, Jack Schiegel, and especially Karl Klare. Partial financial support in the form of
unresticted summer research grants has come from Dean Thomas Christopher and the Uni-
versity of Alabama School of Law. This essay is dedicated to the memory of Marxist Per-
spectives and to the spirit of its spirit, Eugene Genovese.
1. M. HoRwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION oF AMERucAN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977).
2. Chapter I originally appeared as Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Concep-
tion of American Law, 1780-1820, in 5 PRSPECTIVES IN AMmCAN HISTORY 287 (D. Fleming
& B. Bailyn eds. 1971); chapter H originally appeared as Horwitz, The Transformation in
the Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248 (1973); a
large portion of chapter VI originally appeared as Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of
Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 917 (1974); and chapter VIII originally appeared as
Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 251 (1975). Slight changes in
each have occurred through their reappearance in book form, but nothing essential was
revised.
3. Used pejoratively by John Philip Reid to describe my reaction to Horwitz's early work.
Reid, A Plot Too Doctrinaire (Book Review), 55 TEx. L. Rv. 1307, 1310 (1977). While I
admit that my views have matured on these matters over the past few years, this essay will
demonstrate the extent to which I am still dazzled by Horwitz.
4. The phrase is my own. See Holt, Now and Then: The Uncertain State of Nineteenth-
Century American Legal History, 7 INn. L. REv. 615, 625 (1974). By using the phrase, I
663
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:663
history.
More than a tinge of freshness and progressivism was expected
because of Horwitz's trenchant criticism of many of his predeces-
sors in the field. Three general characteristics of the work of those
predecessors drew Horwitz's ire. "[O]rthodox lawyer's legal his-
tory," by emphasizing timelessness, continuity, technique, profes-
sionalism, doctrine, and "logic,"-Horwitz noted in a fiery review
essay-has been "part of a politically conservative ideology of le-
galism" which has deliberately separated and ignored the influ-
ences of politics and economics upon the law and which has paid
no attention to "political struggle," in order "to pervert the real
function of history by reducing it to the pathetic role of justifying
the world as it is." Thus, Horwitz concluded, much of what has
been done previously in legal history was actively conservative and
almost consciously anti-democratic.
Second, too much emphasis had been placed by others on consti-
tutional law. Not only are "constitutional cases . . unrepresenta-
meant that "[r]esearch and writing should be based upon solid philosophical grounds and
should be devoted to the argumentation and explication of broad but definite soci-
ophilosophical points of view," Holt, Preface to EsSAYS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY at xiii (W. Holt ed. 1976), by those who operate "from the assumption that
legal doctrine grows and changes only to meet certain social needs," in the desire to demon-
strate the ways in which "[liaw and legal institutions have proven to be crucial in American
history.... To grapple with such material, only a broad and deep theoretical approach will
suffice." Holt, Now and Then, supra, at 616-17 (footnote omitted).
A few others seem to have seen the primal necessity of working from and within a com-
prehensive field theory. See, e.g., Presser, Revising the Conservative Tradition: Towards a
New American Legal History (Book Review), 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 700, 711 (1977). While I
reject any idealistic conclusions that might be drawn from these statements-neither theo-
ries nor ideas nor laws will bring about necessary social change by themselves; nor can the-
ory usefully be completely abstracted from history or practice-a theoretical and scientific
understanding of history and law remains a sine qua non for useful legal history. As the rest
of this essay will make clear, I believe that the best theoretical perspective on modern social
life is provided by the works of Karl Marx, as amplified and extended by the work of many
other people who write from the standpoint of the political left.
5. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 276, 283, 281 (1973). Using the excellent example of the writing of
Roscoe Pound, Horwitz accurately characterized the political thrust of these writers as
"anti-Marxist," who never tell us about "the growth of democracy or, indeed, of the emer-
gence of socialism," and who dismiss seemingly democratic trends in the law, such as the
codification movement during the Jacksonian Era, "either as the political goal of a lunatic
fringe led by a demagogic leader or, when all else is lost, as an unwholesome and untrust-
worthy democratic force." Id. at 277, 280, 281.
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tive either as intellectual history or as examples of social control,"
Horwitz felt, but also "the excessive equation of constitutional law
with 'law'. . . focuses historians on the nay-saying function of law
and, more specifically, on the rather special circumstances of judi-
cial intervention into statutory control." A useful enterprise would
be, Horwitz asserted, "to study the relationship between private
law (tort, contract, property, commercial law) and economic
change," in order to eliminate the distortions of special circum-
stances and to study the manner in which judges acted positively
to aid social change.'
Finally, Horwitz noted that a large group of nearly-contempora-
neous legal historians, who eschewed both the simplistic and ethe-
real neutralism of the orthodox conservatives and the distorted fo-
cus of the constitutionalists, nevertheless were to be criticized for
their adherence to a "consensus view" of American history. In a
massive and relatively successful attempt to buttress the govern-
mental activism of the New Deal by demonstrating that "laissez-
faire" was the aberration and not the norm with respect to eco-
nomic intervention and direction by government in the United
States' past, these historians "were much more concerned with
finding evidence of governmental intervention than they were in
asking in whose interest" the interventions were had. Thus, "the
historical writing of the last generation [has] tended to ignore all
questions about the effects of governmental activity on the distri-
bution of wealth and power in American society."7
Horwitz promised to show that, despite the best efforts of gener-
ations of legal historians to hide the fact, law was and is politics,
actively made by lawmakers, judicial as well as legislative; and that
a thorough study would exemplify the consistent trends of favorit-
ism towards certain elements of society in the legal-history record.
It was indeed quite a dazzling prospect for those of us who had
partially and varyingly grasped the truths toward which we now
hoped and expected to be led. Also, many legal historians who did
not agree with these goals awaited the demonstration that they
were apologists for an economically biased but neutrally disguised
political order.
6. M. HoRwiTz, supra note 1, at xii.
7. Id. at xiii-xiv.
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The complete book now has been available for more than five
years. It has received a good deal of critical attention, both from
the left8 and from the right.9 Its general provocative excellence was
recognized by its having been awarded the Bancroft Prize, em-
blematic of the best volume or volumes of history published in a
given year. Unfortunately but not unexpectedly, scholarly criticism
has focused on Transformation's weaknesses rather than its
strengths, obscuring or even denying its important contributions
with a volley of quibbles, distortions, misunderstandings, and even
in some cases open refusals to accept the evidence Horwitz has so
painstakingly gathered. Only four attempts have been made to dis-
credit Horwitz's reading of the evidence from the nineteenth cen-
tury, however.10 Even radical commentators, while generally more
8. See, e.g., Foner, "Get a Lawyer!" (Book Review), N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 14, 1977, at
37-39; Genovese, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 726 (1978); Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of
American Law, 1 MARXIST PERSPECTES 96, 106-08 (1978); Sugarman, Book Review, 7 BRIT.
J.L. & Soc'v 297 (1980); Sugarman, Theory and Practice in History: a Prologue to the
Study of the Relationship between Law and Economy from a Socio-historical Perspective,
in LAW, STATE AND SocIETy 70, 74-80 (B. Fryer et al. eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Sugarman, Theory and Practice].
9. See, e.g., Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American Legal History: A Commentary on
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, and on the Common Law in
America, 53 IND. L.J. 449 (1978); McClain, Legal Change and Class Interests: A Review
Essay on Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 382
(1980); Simpson, The Horwitz Theis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533
(1979); Teachout, Light in Ashes: The Problem of "Respect for the Rule of Law" in Ameri-
can Legal History (Book Review), 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 241 passim (1978); Arnold, Book Re-
view, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 241 (1977); Bloomfield, Book Review, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1102 (1977);
Gilmore, From Tort to Contract: Industrialization and the Law (Book Review), 86 YALE
L.J. 788 (1977); Hurst, Book Review, 21 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 175 (1977); Kettner, Book Re-
view, 8 J. INTEmRDiSCPLINARY HIST. 390 (1977); Presser, supra note 4; Reid, supra note 3;
Scheiber, Back to "the Legal Mind"? Doctrinal Analysis and the History of Law (Book
Review), 5 Rev. Am. HIsT. 458 (1977); Williams, Book Review, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1187
(1978); Winship, Book Review, 31 Sw. L.J. 751 (1977).
10. See Bridwell, supra note 9; Williams, supra note 9; and Simpson, supra note 9, all
discussed in part llI.D. of this Article.
As this essay was going to press, a major critique of Horwitz's treatment of nineteenth-
century tort law became available. See Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nine-
teenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Reinterpretation]. In a thoroughly-documented and well-written if acerbic fashion, Gary
Schwartz argues that Horwitz (and others mentioned herein, such as Lawrence Friedman
and Robert Gordon) have failed to show either that negligence succeeded strict liability at
the beginning of this time period or that negligence law provided a subsidy for the develop-
ment of industry and entrepreneurship (except in the specific instance of work-related in-
jury). Schwartz attempts to demonstrate that the notion that liability should follow fault
666
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favorable and more enthusiastic, have neither placed strong
enough emphasis on the book's significant breakthrough nor fo-
cused sufficiently thorough theoretical attention upon its flaws."
It is the purpose of this essay to demonstrate that The Transfor-
mation of American Law is a significant and important contribu-
tion both to history and to historiography. Horwitz has shattered
has always been the norm in Anglo-American tort law, and that, at least in the nineteenth-
century United States, negligence law was not discriminatory. plaintiffs won much of the
time when they sued industry and entrepreneurs. See also Schwartz, The Vitality of Negli-
gence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Vitality].
I have neither the time nor the expertise necessary to assess the validity of Schwartz's
claims, at this juncture. A few preliminary and tentative observations are, however, possible.
First, Schwartz deals chiefly with New Hampshire and California cases, attempting to refute
only three interpretations of cases made by Horwitz and otherwise not coming to grips with
the historic social and economic context presented by Horwitz. Second, while Schwartz finds
not "a single New Hampshire tort opinion that bears the stamp of the dynamic, utilitarian
reasoning that Horwitz believes was characteristic of that period's judiciary," Reinterpreta-
tion, supra, at 1731, the instrumentalist thesis of Transformation is hardly disturbed. Hor-
witz does not claim that instrumentalism was characteristic of each and every opinion.
Third, Schwartz may be right that "strict liability" is an erroneous reading of the pre-
1800 tort cases, but he is right for the wrong reasons. Schwartz's work is founded upon an
ahistoric view that some "common-sense" notion of fault, apparently roughly defined just as
the core idea of negligence is defined today, see Vitality, supra, at 991-92, 993, 995, 999, has
always been "there" in Anglo-American jurisprudence. This ignores class, status, and the
realities of differentials in political power and access to the courts. Robert Rabin is likely
much closer to the mark when he takes into account "a conservative judiciary" and "tradi-
tional notions of class privilege, social custom, and commercial usage" to underpin his argu-
ment that "fault liability emerged out of a world-view dominated largely by no-liability
thinking." Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation,
15 GA. L. REv. 925, 960, 928 (1981). That is, nineteenth-century tort theory allowed more
plaintiffs to think they would be able to sue, but probably not nearly so many actually to
recover.
Fourth, Schwartz criticizes from the right. He finds Richard Posner's law-and-economics
maxims "delightfully audacious," Reinterpretation, supra, at 1722 n.31, but has only harsh
words for Horwitz when all other torts law historians of whom he treats receive at least
modicums of praise. In time-honored particularistic and stridently individualistic fashion,
he twists the focus knob so as to bring into view only "A vs. B," ignoring social context and
the broader questions about the social meaning of "fault." Most importantly, from the
standpoint of this essay, Schwartz believes in the unmitigated existence of "the public mo-
rality" and "community attitudes," Vitality, supra, at 1003, 1004-in short, in consensus, a
notion which will be called into question by the thrust of my essay.
11. The two pieces by Sugarman, supra note 8, give a judiciously balanced appraisal of
Horwitz, to which I am much indebted, but unfortunately do not treat their subject at suffi-
ciently great length. Sugurman's promised paper, Horwitz, Simpson, Atiyah and the Trans-
formation of Anglo-American Law, infra note 127, should supply some of this deficiency
and should complement most of the conclusions reached herein.
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the grip of conventional legal history upon the past, making it now
impossible for the old apolitical, deterministic or idealistic catego-
ries to seem so powerful, so convincing, or so useful. The many
who continue to practice the older necromancy will be unable to
avoid peeking guiltily over their shoulders, while the rest of us
have an example of a critical approach to legal history, one which
by its emphasis upon political, economic, and social interaction
recommends the study of legal practice and adjudication as
praxis-as world-creating, meaning-endowing, value-full, living
human activity.12 Horwitz has opened a whole new universe for us,
the real universe of the past and present.
Transformation does, however, contain significant problems of
content, attitude, and explicit theoretical perspective, problems
which allow it only to point towards a useful "field theory" rather
than to contain and demonstrate it. The book lies suspended be-
tween the old and the new, deeply ambiguous and troubled about
the proper manner in which to treat a world both flawed and cha-
otic and yet so full of promise, looking to the future while unable
to rid itself of much of those intellectual modes of the past it so
correctly condemns. In all this it is perhaps a mirror of our times.
Marxists following Gramsc'1 have rejected a Leninesque determin-
ism,14 finding it crucial to deal with artifacts such as law and the
state, but without widespread agreement upon the proper theoreti-
cal treatment to be accorded such "superstructure" elements. 5 A
12. Cf. Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 TELOS 123 (1979).
13. See A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Q. Hoare & G. Smith eds.
1971).
14. Determinists emphasize "structure" in interpreting the following fundamental obser-
vation by Marx, giving "superstructure" an insufficient amount of attention:
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic struc-
ture of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political super-
structure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The
mode of production conditions [sometimes translated as "determines"] the
general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the conscious-
ness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that de-
termines their consciousness.
K. MARx, A CONmmUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 20-21 (M. Dodd ed.
Moscow 1970) (1st ed. 1859). "Law [in a class society] has been characterized in orthodox
Marxism (particularly in the writings of Lenin) as nothing more than the direct embodi-
ment of the interests of the dominant economi6 classes in society." Sugarman, Theory and
Practice, supra note 8, at 81.
15. Important recent contributions to this debate, in English, include G. COHEN, KARL
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part of their difficulty may be understood as similar to that of Hor-
witz: a continuation of the use of bourgeois categorization."" Hor-
witz cannot be sharply faulted for failure to resolve such a deep-
seated problem. That so many committed and thoughtful Marxists
have remained enmeshed in the coils of an essentially bourgeois
determinism is ample demonstration of the sheer, overpowering
difficulty of breaking with the culture of an existing mode of pro-
duction absent systemic economic changes.
The increasingly chaotic and warlike circumstances of everyday
life for us al17 render it increasingly more imperative that we find
ways to change the future, in part by understanding the past, in
part by coming to recognize the differences between bourgeois cul-
ture and socialist culture. Horwitz has moved legal history forward
from Transformation,"' but a thorough critique of that work will,
it is hoped, help forward movement accelerate. This essay first will
attempt to summarize the main thrusts of Horwitz's argument in
MARX's THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE (1978); T. SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLU-
TIONS (1979); E. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1978); R. WIL-
LIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE (1977); Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,
NEw LEFT REV., Nov. 1976-Jan. 1977, at 5-78.
16. "By deciding to work with capitalist categories, Proudhon, according to Marx, cannot
completely disassociate himself from the 'truths' which these categories contain." B.
OLLMAN, ALIENATION: MARX'S CONCEPTION OF MAN IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 13 (2d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as B. OLLMAN, ALIENATION]. The first portion of Ollman's important book
demonstrates the necessity of using Marx's dialectical mode of reasoning and speaking. Id.
at 3-69. See also Ollman, On Teaching Marxism, in SOCIAL AND SEXUAL REVOLUTION: ESSAYS
ON MARX AND REICH 126 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Oilman, Teaching Marxism].
17. For a thorough and apt description of much of the chaos of modern life, see C. LASCH,
THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM; AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS
(1978). See also, e.g., B. OLLMAN, ALIENATION, supra note 16, at 131-233; H. BRAVERMAN,
LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1974). For a theoretical perspective on the interpretation of ruling class and working class
consciousnesses, creating leeway for a greater understanding of disaffecting circumstances in
the "middle classes," see E. WRIGHT, CLASS, CRISIS AND THE STATE 30-110 (1978).
18. See, for example, his masterful (if overly condensed) treatment of the law-and-eco-
nomics movement: Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
905 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Horwitz, Law and Economics]. Cf. Horwitz, The Historical
Contingency of the Role of History, 90 YALE L.J. 1057 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Horwitz,
History]. Many of the articles in the Yale Law Journal Symposium on Legal Scholarship
(of which this latter article is a part) demonstrate the manner in which others are beginning
to join Horwitz on the path toward a radical legal scholarship, and it may be seen that no
contributor (save Tushnet) has gone as far as Horwitz. See Kennedy, Cost-Reduction The-
ory as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275 (1981).
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Transformation. His essential radicalism19 will be demonstrated by
contrasting his views with the arguments of those who have criti-
cized the book from the right. The essay will conclude with a dis-
cussion of what may be learned from Transformation's flaws.
II. THE ACHIEVEMENT IN Transformation
Horwitz's thesis is that basic rules in important segments of
"private law" were consciously altered or repudiated by common
law judges in order to aid, legitimize, and mystify the transforma-
tion of the American economy into an entrepreneurial-capitalist
one, during the period between the Revolution and the Civil War.20
At the time of the Revolution, Horwitz claims, American law mir-
19. For purposes of this essay, radicals are those who see the systemic nature of the con-
temporaneous organization of society and who understand that the system is at the root of
social problems. Marxists are radicals who understand precisely "how this system gives rise
to these problems .... Marxists analyze the workings of capitalism to make sense of the
patterns that radicals only see and liberals still have to learn about." Olman, Teaching
Marxism, supra note 16, at 131. Three different words, "liberal," "capitalist," and "bour-
geois," each give some sense of the ethos and culture surrounding this contemporaneous
organization of society; they will be used interchangeably in this Article to refer to that
society and those who defend it (whether consciously or not). The interlocking, contradic-
tory, and complex nature of liberal thought is depicted and criticized in R. UNGER, KNOWL-
EDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
It must be noted that contemporaneous political usage, which finds great differences
between "liberals" and "conservatives," is not followed here; both of these groups are in-
cluded with all of the supporters and defenders of capitalism. See Tushnet, Dia-Tribe (Book
Review), 78 MICH. L. REv. 694 (1980): "The politics of liberalism ... are inherently con-
servative. They assume that contemporary American society approximates a just society
.... They also, and concomitantly, deny the need for massive and therefore probably vio-
lent changes in the structure of the society." Id. at 709.
Richard Hofstadter long ago recognized the essential unity of America's supposed political
divisions:
[T]he range of vision embraced by the primary contestants in the major parties
has always been bounded by the horizons of property and enterprise. However
much at odds, on specific issues, the major political traditions have shared a
belief in the rights of property, the philosophy of competition; they have ac-
cepted the economic virtues of capitalist culture as the necessary qualities of
man. . . . The business of politics-so the creed runs-is to protect this com-
petitive world, to foster it on occasion, to patch up its incidental abuses but
not to cripple it with a plan for common collective action.
R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION at viii (1948).
20. As will be seen by a comparison, this section of the essay is deeply indebted to the
summaries of Transformation in Foner, supra note 8; Gilmore, supra note 9, at 788-89;
Presser, supra note 4, at 701-10; Sugarman, Theory and Practice, supra note 8, at 74-76.
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rored English law in its promotion of calm and stability, its em-
phasis on protection of existing landed property rights, its focus on
strict liability for invasions of person or property, and its lack of
attention to the solution of typical commercial transactions. The
economic realities of life in the new nation soon began a
change-slowly at first, and then ever more rapidly and disjunc-
tively-as commodities markets and futures markets came into be-
ing and as entrepreneurs, factory-builders, land-speculators, and
corporation-founders replaced petty merchants and the landed
gentry in positions of economic importance. American law changed
also, Horwitz demonstrates, in ways that were overtly intended to
aid capital growth and those who benefited from it, at the expense
of other segments of society. "[S]ubsidisation through technical le-
gal doctrine mystified the underlying political choices," avoiding
"the more open public discussion and scrutiny that would have re-
sulted if development had been encouraged by direct taxation.""
The major change in law can be described as the advent of a
"contractarian" or will theory. Grant Gilmore has succinctly sum-
marized Horwitz's argument:
Property interests lost their sacrosanct status as the ideas of ec-
onomic growth and competition came to have a more compelling
charm for the 19th-century mind than the older ideas of stabil-
ity and monopoly. For strict liability and the wide protection
afforded existing interests in property, there was substituted the
much narrower concept of liability based on carelessness, fault,
or negligence .... [Elmerging "contractarian" theories ...
purported to base liability on will, consent, or "meeting of the
minds," rather than on status or vested property rights.22
Law now seemed to focus on the individual, or on individual units
in society, and emphasized their independence, their ability to act
and interact more or less as they chose, and their ability both to
amass and to use economic power to solve and resolve the
problems of daily life, rather than any need to rely upon group,
communal, or civil aid. As noted by Marx (who came to these con-
clusions essentially during the time period of which Horwitz
writes), the individualistic ethos of contractarian legalism plays a
21. Sugarman, Theory and Practice, supra note 8, at 75.
22. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 789.
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necessarily central role in the growth and stability of a society
based upon commodities, exchange, profit, and the supposedly bar-
gained-for appropriation of the power of workers by employers. 23
Horwitz capably demonstrates the truth of Marx's insight: contract
(as we know it today) was both new and central to the period.
Contractarianism, as broadly defined above, became suffused
throughout American law, and in several thorough chapters Hor-
witz carefully delineates these changes in important areas of law.24
In contract (strictly defined), the eighteenth-century emphasis on
"just price" and fairness in interpersonal dealings gave way to as-
sumptions of equality of bargaining power and a focus on what the
parties "intended." The old "objective theory," which allowed bar-
gains to be judged by external standards of fairness and value, was
replaced by a new "subjective theory," in which caveat emptor, ex-
press contractual language, and refusal to investigate duress or in-
adequacy of "consideration" became the standard approach.
Soon, however, commercial needs for predictability caused the
introduction of another "objective theory," as the actual, expressed
"will" of the parties gave way in many crucial situations to judg-
ment based on standards derived from commercial practices. The
market now reigned supreme, having replaced "the outlook of a
society in which social and moral obligations were considered supe-
rior to economic ones, and in which making the highest possible
profit was not the principal motive shaping human behavior."25
23. 1 K. MARx, CAPrrAL: A CRIMQUE OF POLMCAL ECONOMY 84, 87, 170, 176, 271, 398-99,
540, 574, 583-84, 624 (Int'l Pub. ed. New York 1967) (1st ed. 1867) [hereinafter cited as K.
MARX, CAPrrAL). Max Weber is commonly held to have come to an apparently similar con-
clusion, "that law played an indispensable role in guaranteeing the security and certainty
that capitalism required." Sugarman, however, concludes that the latter's
position seems to have been that, whilst the theoretical implications of the
law's coercive power to guarantee certainty and predictability would lead one
to assume that the law was essential to market capitalism, in practice this was
not always the case .... Weber contended that whilst today "economic ex-
change is quite overwhelmingly guaranteed by the threat of legal coercion,"
from "the purely theoretical point of view legal guarantee by the state is not
indispensable to any basic economic phenomenon."
Sugarman, Theory and Practice, supra note 8, at 72-73.
24. Horwitz deals with contract and commercial law in chapters V and VI of Transforma-
tion, with property and competition in chapters II and IV, and with tort and damages law in
chapter III.
25. Foner, supra note 8, at 37.
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Not so incidentally, the labor of working people came to be viewed
judicially as a commodity like any other.
In property law, the "natural flow" doctrine, which barred ripa-
rian owners from interrupting the flow of a stream to other users
and enjoyers, was replaced, legislatively by mill acts which gave the
owners of economically "beneficial" mills an almost unimpeded
right to flood the lands of others, and judicially by doctrines of
"prior appropriation'? and "prescription," encouraging further mill
construction by permitting the first miller on a stream to interrupt
the flow and to prevent other mill construction thereby. The po-
tential for stanching further development inherent in these rules
then helped persuade judges to overthrow the rules in favor of
"reasonable use" doctrines, wherein conflicting uses could be bal-
anced and new, if competing, uses allowed. Established businesses
of a public nature could in the eighteenth century enjoin competi-
tion, but Horwitz shows that early in the nineteenth century
judges began granting such injunctions on the theory that exclu-
sive franchises would promote growth. This notion was in turn dis-
carded when it became evident that exclusivity would hamper fur-
ther development; the landmark Charles River Bridge case26
"represented the last great contest in America between two differ-
ent models of economic development, ' 27 holding against privileged
exclusivity and in favor of a "free, active, and enterprising [country
where] . . . new channels of communication are daily found neces-
sary. ' 28 Property, inventiveness, even industry itself came to be
understood within the contractarian viewpoint.
Notions of strict legal accountability for "private" activity gave
way to restricted liability which allowed considerable interference
with others as long as one's conduct adhered to judicially estab-
lished "reasonable" standards of care. New "consequential" rules
of damages further limited the liability of actors such as steam lo-
comotives, whose owners might not have to pay for fires caused by
spewing sparks. Just as in other areas of law, "[t]he move from
nuisance to negligence was accomplished in fits and starts,"2 " not
26. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 341 (1837), af'g 24 Mass. (7
Pick.) 344 (1829).
27. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 134.
28. 36 U.S. at 547.
29. Presser, supra note 4, at 704.
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in a smooth and logical development of doctrine, as successive
waves of entrepreneurs seized upon various and sometimes contra-
dictory theories of law to justify first their entry into the market
and then their retention of a competitive position. These contra-
dictions were only apparent from up close, however; overall, Hor-
witz successfully demonstrates that American private law moved
towards a contractarian, individualistic, competitive philosophical
underpinning.
As can be seen, Horwitz believes that most of "the rewriting of
liability law was . . . accomplished on the judicial. . . level."30 In
theory judges were not supposed to make law, but in the late eight-
eenth century a revolutionary, activist self-conception of the
judge's role appeared, mushrooming in the first part of the nine-
teenth century into a widely-accepted "instrumentalist" approach
whereby judges undertook to change or invent doctrine according
to their own notions of what was useful for society, rather than
attempting to adhere to old rules or to fit developments into prece-
dent and tradition. Horwitz asserts that the instrumentalist view
was necessary, as the emergence of rapid economic growth man-
dated the use of concepts and rules which had little or no prece-
dent, and the communitarian ideological foundations of the older
society had to be dispensed with. The notion of instrumentalism
implies that activist judges understood their goals, and indeed
Horwitz shows that in many instances doctrine was altered for spe-
cific developmental reasons. However, the cause-and-effect rela-
tionships were not always so simple; new rules often emerged
"before new or special economic or technological pressure for
change" was applied."1
Instrumentalism is a dangerous theory, relying for its
socioeconomically consistent application upon mechanisms for se-
lection of'the judiciary which are not always available in a democ-
racy. "The open-endedness of debate, the irreverence for the past,
the passionate advocacy of fundamental change. . . must be sup-
pressed in the name of the new consensus."32 Just as instrumental-
30. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 789.
31. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 3. See also, e.g., id. at 89 (negligence).
32. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 790. Eugene Genovese elaborates upon this point:
However much sentimentalists and utopians may rail at the monotonous recur-
rence of a positive theory of law whenever revolutionaries settle down to re-
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ism was attaining its heyday in the 1820's, Horwitz finds, notions
of formalism-the neutrality of law, the political impartiality of
judges, seemingly blind adherence to precedent, and the
like-began to seep back into private law from the realm of public
law, where they had always been predominant. Horwitz concludes
that by the 1860's formalism once again had become the pervasive
mode of judicial exegesis.
"The reformulation of substantive law by the judges went hand
in hand with a systematic reduction of the role of the civil jury.'' s
The eighteenth-century power of juries, usually comprised, as Eric
Foner points out, of small property owners,"' to award damages
according to their own sense of the equities of the situation, was
severely limited by the new theories of restricted liability in a con-
tractarian world. The jury's function of "finding" both the law and
the facts-allowing jurors in essence to be the source of applicable
law-was reduced to only a fragment of the latter role, as judges
both issued definitive and restrictive instructions about rules of
law and combined the realm of facts with other rules which essen-
tially converted many factual issues into issues of law. Jurisdic-
tions which had never used juries-admiralty and equity-were
greatly expanded during the period.
Horwitz also depicts the role of lawyers in helping to bring about
this transformation."5 Those with commercial interests had, before
about 1800, consistently shunned lawyers and the common-law
courts by taking their disputes to arbitrators or to special commer-
build the world they have shattered, any other course would be doomed to
failure .... [A]ll modern ruling classes have much in common in their atti-
tude toward the law, for each must confront the problem of coercion in such a
way as to minimize the necessity for its use, and each must disguise the extent
to which state power does not so much rest on force as represent its actuality.
Even Marxian theory, therefore, must end with the assertion of a positive the-
ory of law and judge natural-law and "higher-law" doctrines to be tactical de-
vices in the extralegal struggle.
E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 26 (1974) (Vintage ed.
1976). As will be discussed at more length in part IV of this Article, see text accompanying
notes 164-167 infra, positivism seems to take one of two legal forms, the instrumental mode
or the formal mode, each containing inner tensions and contradictions which, when
squeezed by socioeconomic reality, tend to force elite legal theorists to turn to the other.
33. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 790.
34. Foner, supra note 8, at 37.
35. See especially chapter V of M. HoRWilTz, supra note 1.
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cial courts where commercial law, more to their liking, was applied,
or by using penal bonds (eliminating the issues of liability and
damages) of special "struck" (i.e., all-merchant) juries in many in-
stances in which they did resort to the common law. The law and
the lawyers reciprocated this pre-1800 separation, Horwitz finds,
by essentially being occupied with the problems of property own-
ers. As commercial interests began to oppose each
other-merchants versus their insurors being the instance Horwitz
finds paradigmatic-and as the instrumental mode of judicial law-
making developed simultaneously with a bench more understand-
ing of and devoted to the ethos of entrepreneurial growth, litiga-
tion before the regular courts became more useful and more palat-
able. The limits placed on jury discretion further "enhanced the
prospects for certainty and predictability,""6 while courts' emerg-
ing hostility to the enforcement of arbitration awards and to struck
juries in commercial cases tended to force commercial disputes to
become lawsuits. Lawyers cast off their previous primary allegiance
to landed interests and "became the enthusiastic allies-or per-
haps the willing servants-of the new masters. '3 7
Transformation is not a book simply about lawyers, or doctrine,
or even law. As Foner has said:
[F]or Horwitz, law ... is a way of interpreting the world ....
The relation between law and society is a reciprocal one; law
both reflects and influences social change .... The modifica-
tions of law which constitute the subject of this book are ele-
ments of what Karl Polanyi called the "great transformation"
from a pre-market society, a historical process which affected
entire ways of life, human relations, and, of course, the law."
The rise of market relations, and the corresponding rise to pre-
dominance of a market-oriented class emphasizing exchange, prof-
its, and (eventually) the use of factories and large masses of hired
workers to produce commodities, were accompanied by the gradual
emergence into general social consciousness of a market ethos
characterized in part by certain typical modes of thought which
36. Presser, supra note 4, at 707.
37. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 789.
38. Foner, supra note 8, at 37; K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1944).
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were reflective of, supportive of, and derived from the new ways in
which the relations of production were organized. Legal notions
and relationships were a quite important part of this new capitalist
culture. While Horwitz's chief occupation is in the telling of the
story of the emergence of liberal rules of law in the American con-
text, there is also evidence in many parts of Transformation of the
advent of typically liberal elements of philosophy and belief: for
example, the death of a communal and corporatistic view of soci-
ety, and its replacement by a particularistic, atomistic, individual-
istic view; 9 the emergence of revulsion against investigating ques-
tions involving substantive justice and against accepting social
definitions of value; ' 0 and the appearance of a tendency to substi-
tute assumptions of equality and similarity for observations of ine-
quality and difference.
Most important, however, is the emergence of the false neutral-
ity with which most realities of capitalist life begin to be disguised
when they are described in liberal language. It probably would be
fatal for the social support (or, at least the docility) needed by the
dominant elements of the system, and perhaps for the self-esteem
of many members of those elites, if the actual inequalities and real,
political influences of capitalism were openly reflected in the man-
ner and means by which capitalism is described to the world. The
disguises, however, were not and are not adopted consciously by
elites, but arise organically as an integral part of the mystification
inherent in a market ethos.42 Thus, the formal, apolitical mode of
decision writing overtakes the instrumental, activist mode. Horwitz
demonstrates that phrases such as "commercial uniformity" and
"legal certainty and predictability" are not neutrally descriptive
but mask political values of and political victories by certain ele-
ments of the population, values and victories that were resisted
and opposed by many who did not want, or did not reap many
immediate or large benefits from, the new market of social
ordering. 3
Despite the lack of evidence presented by Horwitz, there is a
39. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 104, 111.
40. Id. at 161, 181-82.
41. Id. at 240.
42. See text accompanying notes 135-137 infra.
43. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 212.
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strong sense in Transformation that many people opposed the new
ideas and economic organization and that many people were hurt
or ruined thereby. Further, Horwitz finds manipulation of the law
by the merchants and entrepreneurs, and their allies on the bench
and at the bar, for the benefit of those elements which had come to
dominate American society. Not only was "law. . .thought of as
* . .simply reflective of the existing organization of economic and
political power":44
By the middle of the nineteenth century the legal system had
been reshaped to the advantage of men of commerce and indus..
try at the expense of farmers, workers, consumers, and other less
powerful groups within the society .... [L]egal doctrines ...
maintained the new distribution of economic and political power
... [and law] actively promoted a legal redistribution of wealth
against the weakest groups in the society.45
Most of Horwitz's research into changing legal doctrine demon-
strates that the new rules attempted to favor entrepreneurs, busi-
nessmen, and capitalist growth-oriented interests by altering tradi-
tional notions of liability so as apparently to reallocate much of the
costs of enterprise to others-to workers, to consumers, to the
landed gentry, to those caught up in or injured by the dangerous
consequences of growth. He concludes that instrumentalism and
the new rules subsidized growth, and that an alternative and
potentially more egalitarian, less open form of subsidy-
taxation-was not turned to.46
At the heart of the various previous approaches to legal history
criticized by Horwitz were devices whose effect has been to ignore
or obscure both the manipulation of law by elites and the fact that
American history has been a continuous social struggle, some
groups winning, while other groups, containing much larger num-
bers, lost. While the conservative school has assumed the law is
always neutral, ethereal, and apolitical, with lawyers and judges
being professionalistically unconcerned in the results of legal dis-
44. Id. at 253.
45. Id. at 253-54.
46. "[T]he law had come simply to ratify those forms of inequality that the market sys-
tem produced." Id. at 210. For the discussion of taxation as an alternative not taken, see id.
at 99-101, 260.
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putes, Horwitz has demonstrated that judges and lawyers during
the early modern period of American history took sides motivated
by politics and economics. While the constitutionalists deflected
attention from the socioeconomic nitty-gritty by studying decisions
whose language was neutrally formal and whose chief concerns
seemed to be in the ideological realm of fundamental principles.
Horwitz uses a study of everyday legal doctrines to hold the
reader's feet to the fire of real problems. And while the consensus
historians "assumed that nineteenth-century law reflected the un-
derlying consensus of a society united in its commitment to eco-
nomic growth and entrepreneurial activity, Horwitz sees the legal
system as ridden with deep social and ideological conflicts
[that] reflected far-reaching divisions in a society undergoing rapid
economic transformation. '47
The initial breakthrough promised by Horwitz has, in Transfor-
mation, been realized. No one can put down the book without hav-
ing had shaken to the core basic assumptions about the neutrality
of law and the calm, efficient, majority-approved nature of eco-
nomic growth and American history. Whatever its deficiencies,
Transformation has turned a corner in American legal historiogra-
phy by drawing aside the curtain of fuzziness, mystique, and neu-
trality that has until now cloaked the history of law and attempted
to keep us from seeing naked its political, biased reality.48 Law is
but an element-if a crucial one-in the continuing social struggle.
Morton Horwitz in The Transformation of American Law has at
the least demonstrated that primary fact.
III. THE FAILURE OF HORWITZ'S CRITICS
The best measures of Horwitz's success and superiority have
been given by his mainstream critics. Each has retained those
characteristics of conservatism and adherence to legalistic catego-
47. Foner, supra note 8, at 37.
48. Some radicals apparently have concluded that demystification constitutes the whole
of the radical task. See Davis, Critical Jurisprudence: An Essay on the Legal Theory of
Robert Burt's Taking Care of Strangers, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 419, esp. 436 n.42; Freeman,
Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981). While demystifica-
tion is certainly essential, a program for change informed by materialistic social theory is
concomitantly necessary in order to avoid social chaos.
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ries which Horwitz pointed out and condemned," and the utility of
which he refuted in Transformation. None has been able to assimi-
late or appreciate any part of the fundamental truth he demon-
strated-that law is a socioeconomic phenomenon, its principles
biased towards socioeconomic elites. Only three attempts have
been made to dispute his interpretation of the nineteenth-century
cases, and none of these has been successful. Shocked, amazed, be-
mused, bewildered, urbanely smug, or thoroughly rattled, these
scholars have either politely applauded and then ignored Horwitz's
central thesis, or have gotten angry in various scholarly ways, but
none has yet successfully refuted him.
All three of the trends in writing conservative American legal
history identified by Horwitz are represented among those who
have criticized Horwitz from the right. Some scholars fall into
more than one of the categories used,50 which is not anomalous
(though it may result in internal contradiction) since all of these
schools are basically bourgeois,51 supportive of the existing system
in ways that a thorough understanding of that system would lead
one to predict and identify.2 The first three sections of this part
will describe Horwitz's critics using the three categories he devel-
oped, while the fourth will deal briefly with the three attempts to
call his substantive interpretation into question.
49. Note 5 & accompanying text supra.
50. For example, while Gilmore's review of Horwitz is deterministic, see text accompany-
ing note 55 infra, his book THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) follows a quite orthodox ideal-
ism; some of the reviewers of Horwitz exhibit characteristics of each of the three trends, see,
e.g., Bloomfield, supra note 9; Winship, supra note 9. Cf. Tushnet, Book Review, 45 U. CHI.
L. REV. 906 (1978).
51. For a definition of the use of "bourgeois" in this essay, see note 19 supra; for a thor-
ough treatment of bourgeois and other critiques of contemporary legal scholarship, see
Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Tushnet, Legal Schol-
arship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981). Both of these articles are critiqued
in Freeman, supra note 48.
52. Accord, Tushnet, supra note 50, at 906-07; Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology,
33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 754-55 (1981):
[P.S. Atiyah's history of freedom of contract in England] blends an active in-
strumental model (law as promoting or facilitating the needs and values of a
changing society) with a reflective, passive one (law as depicting through its
forms an otherwise intact social reality). This vague model ... allows him to
maintain a balanced, liberal viewpoint throughout the book.
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A. The Consensus Critique
The "consensus" approach essentially derives from Charles
Beard and the Progressives, Legal Realists, and New Dealers who,
believing themselves to be located upon the left of American polit-
ics, supported governmental intervention to chastise and restrain
business, to stabilize the economy, and to assure that disadvan-
taged groups receive at least minimal moral and economic support
in their struggle to approximate the American dream. Consensus
historians accept the primacy of economics and economic interest
groups in politics (assuming their benevolence), and have little re-
gard for the motivating importance of individuals or ideas upon
history.
A restrained and unemotional branch of consensus thought
adopts a rigid determinism, whereby law and other structures of
thought always directly reflect patterns of social and economic or-
ganization. Lawrence Friedman's A History of American Law, for
example,
treats American law.., not as a kingdom unto itself, not as a
set of rules and concepts, not as the province of lawyers alone,
but as a mirror of society. It takes nothing as historical accident,
nothing as autonomous, everything as relative and molded by
economy and society .... ["s] The [legal] system works like a
blind, insensate machine. It does the bidding of those whose
hands are on the controls. The laws ... reflect the goals and
policies of those who call the tune. 4
Thus, Grant Gilmore praises Horwitz's book because "it focuses on
the process by which the precapitalist law of the 18th century was,
as it had to be, metamorphosed. . . .Professor Horwitz has gath-
ered a rich harvest for any reader who is interested in the process
by which a system of law is transformed in response to fundamen-
53. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 10 (1973).
54. Id. at 14. In a penetrating essay, Mark Tushnet has demonstrated the inability of
Friedman's deterministic approach to provide a useful analysis of legal history, see Tushnet,
Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's "A
History of American Law," 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81, but in many ways Tushnet's criticism does
not extend to the breadth and depth of Friedman's liberalism, and I believe it can be use-
fully supplemented by remarks made herein.
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tal changes in the society which the law reflects."55
Another, more optimistic and ebullient branch of the consensus
school, while deterministic, is not so rigidly so, admitting of more
autonomy for historic actors and ideas at intermediate levels of
analysis, finding limits of the human capacity to plan and to un-
derstand located in dark and mystical notions of "drift and de-
fault" surrounding human history.5 6 Thus, Harry Scheiber allows
that "none of the evidence" his review of Horwitz has brought for-
ward "suggests that 'the weakest groups in the society' were not
exploited through the law by the 'strongest.' But the form that op-
position did take, in reacting to dominant trends, deserves
attention. '57
Both branches unite, however, in extending praise to those por-
tions of Transformation which seem to underscore the emphasis
which this group of scholars has always placed upon "pragmatism"
("Horwitz's. . .instrumentalism. . . advances under a new label
what [Willard] Hurst called, simply 'pragmatism' ,,),58 arguing that
most of the book repeats points they have been making for years:
"[T]he essentials of the argument-Professor Horwitz would, I am
sure, agree-are not all that novel; they have been current for 30 or
40 years.''59
Consensus legal historians and other Progressives and New Deal-
ers have always emphasized the interplay of economics and pres-
sure groups in the formulation of law-John Dawson comes imme-
diately to mind-and the Legal Realists such as Karl Llewellyn
(contrasting the Grand Style with the Formal Style of adjudica-
tion) and Jerome Frank were characterized by a common insight
that judges made law. Horwitz owes these scholars a great
debt-one which Gilmore is correct in presuming Horwitz readily
55. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 792, 793 (footnote omitted).
56. Scheiber, supra note 9, at 464. For an early, somewhat idealistic analysis of "drift" in
the work of the foremost member of this branch of the consensus school (Willard Hurst),
see Holt, Book Review, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 982, 987-90. For an apt critique, see Gordon,
supra note 51, at 1036-37.
57. Scheiber, supra note 9, at 464.
58. Id. at 465.
59. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 791. Scheiber is a bit harsher on this point: "[T]his work
... would have been ... much richer.., had it... been less concerned with wrapping
some well-established ideas in the drapery of new rhetoric." Scheiber, supra note 9, at 459-
60.
[Vol. 23:663
LEGAL HISTORY TRANSFORMATION
would acknowledge-but his failure to cite them as his intellectual
forebears in Transformation is a way of underscoring that he has
radically gone beyond and broken with their work. Economic pres-
sure groups, as seen by the consensus thinkers, do not cleave into
two main classes, one powerful, small, and in control, the other
large, weak, and always fighting for control; and the Legal Realists
never came to a coherent explanation of how or why judges made
law because the Realists refused to acknowledge the existence of
these two fundamental competing social forces.60 According to the
consensus historians society runs essentially harmoniously thanks
to the existence of a basic social consensus growing out of competi-
tion among assumedly equal interest groups, all for the better since
this agreed-upon economic growth is asserted to benefit everyone.
Consensus historian Charles McClain concludes:
Seen from this perspective many of the changes in the common
law described by Horwitz ... seem salutary. Rather than con-
stituting evidence of a conspiracy to gut the law of its humane
core, these changes appear to reflect the legal order's responsive-
ness to changed social conditions and its ability to evolve in the
direction of greater flexibility, greater maturity, and, indeed,
greater plain common sense.e
The arguments presented by Horwitz, reflecting a society torn be-
tween groups in struggle, not mediated by any underlying consen-
sus, are ignored.
The chief criticism advanced by the consensus advocates is that
Horwitz fails to emphasize the shifting pluralistic diversity of
America and the interest groups which contend in it. "In many
specific cases [analyzed by Horwitz]," asserts Scheiber, "paradoxi-
cally the litigants on both sides were often indistinguishable as to
wealth and social class. '8 2 "Nor is it possible, without gross over-
simplification," argues Gilmore, "to reduce the emerging rules in
such commercial specialities as sales and negotiable instruments to
60. This argument about the Legal Realists is elaborated upon in Holt, Why American
Law Schools Cannot Teach Justice, 3 ALSA F., Sept. 1978, at 5; Tushnet, supra note 51, at
1207, 1210.
61. McClain, supra note 9, at 396-97 (footnote omitted).
62. Scheiber, supra note 9, at 463; accord, McClain, supra note 9, at 395.
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the simple paradigm of capitalists exploiting consumers.""3
While on the surface of events interests and causative patterns
seem many and varied, a sophisticated class analysis which gets
beneath the surface to hidden interconnections among groups,
events, and interests in order to demonstrate cultural and ideologi-
cal patterns and influences (an analysis which, unfortunately, is
not developed by Horwitz, as will be argued in part IV of this es-
say) can demonstrate that, for example, cases involving solely up-
per class litigants yet serve upper class purposes. Taking a defini-
tion of "economics" and a notion of causation which are both
entirely too narrow and constricted," the determinists of the con-
sensus school focus too closely, expecting to find a direct, immedi-
ate, one-to-one correspondence in every instance. When their ex-
pectations are not met they conclude that division of the world
into two classes is too simple, and that society's story is really the
interaction of a kaleidoscope of variously defined and shifting, rel-
atively equal interest groups.6 Willard Hurst insists that, because
"there was a substantial consensus on the social utility of the mar-
ket," much of nineteenth-century conflict was between members of
the "upwardly mobile middle class" for whom "class attitudes and
aspirations were blurred. 66 Stephen Presser carries this argument
to extremes:
While most private law doctrines that were litigated in the ap-
pellate courts support Horwitz's thesis of merchant and en-
trepreneurial ascendancy in the law, there must have been many
other legal developments in the nineteenth century that had lit-
tle to do with these groups .... [A]ction by state legislatures
[other than that occasionally hinted at by Horwitz] may have
had a significant social impact on American life in realms apart
from economics....
... For all we know, most of the consumers and farmers, in
63. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 795.
64. See generally B. OLLMAN, ALIENATION, supra note 16, at 5-40.
65. A diversity in regional development is another favorite argument. See, e.g., Bloom-
field, supra note 9, at 1106; Hurst, supra note 9, at 176.
The point is not whether regional variations exist but whether our inquiry for an explana-
tion of legal variants should end when we discover regional origins for them. A better theo-
retical focus always will impel one behind geography to economics.
66. Hurst, supra note 9, at 178. Scheiber also expresses continued adherence to this con-
sensus view, giving no justification. Scheiber, supra note 9, at 463.
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absolute terms, were better off after the nineteenth-century le-
gal changes than before. 7
This substitution of wishful thinking for analysis demonstrates
both how unsettling Horwitz's views are and how strongly a cher-
ished viewpoint lingers even when its holder suspects how little ev-
idence he has for it. The possibility that "economics" might be de-
fined quite broadly as a primary social factor, one which has
pervasive influence upon most other "realms" of life, and the pos-
sibility that "legal developments" concerning which no commercial
interests were directly represented nevertheless might be influ-
enced significantly by social forces favorable to the overall eco-
nomic interests of capitalists, are somehow never visualized.
The tendency of liberal thought to particularism makes it easy
for members of the consensus school to focus on specific events
without looking for deeper connections, and thus to produce evi-
dence of variety; however, the kind of evidence of a struggle be-
tween competing interests and the concomitant lack of an underly-
ing social consensus brought forward by Horwitz should at least
give scholars pause. This is not to say that the interests of compet-
ing classes are not expressed in a variety of ways, with a variety of
intensities, and indeed sometimes contradictorily, depending pri-
marily upon one's time-period of historical focus and one's level of
analysis; it is to argue that Horwitz's analysis implies a more pow-
67. Presser, supra note 4, at 720-21. Presser concludes by denying the possibility of a
class analysis, while simultaneously suggesting that factors of class in the law made the
burst of entrepreneurial growth possible:
Perhaps in nineteenth-century America, particularly in the West, people
moved so freely from one occupational group to another that attempts to draw
sharp distinctions between "farmers" and "merchants" distort social
reality...
Horwitz's work is most impressive not because it demonstrates the ascen-
dance of any particular group in the law, but because it suggests that the de-
velopment of American law reflects a continuing struggle between competing
economic and social interests. ...
In the limited sense that the law may have provided equal economic oppor-
tunity for those willing and able to learn the techniques of commerce and for
those able to employ native intelligence, inventiveness, and shrewdness, the
law may have been much more democratic than Horwitz suggests.
Id. at 721-22. What an immense amount of economic restraint can be captured by and hid-
den in the single word "able" in that passage! Who was "able," and why? Horwitz's theory
of law can tell us; Presser's cannot.
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erful explanation than that of the consensus thinkers because it is
willing to take into account conflict and struggle in American his-
tory, thereby dispensing with the need for false and mystifying
masks, such as the theory of an underlying consensus, and thereby
attempting to explain the sources of bias which permeate Ameri-
can law. Horwitz's analysis does not ignore the plight of millions
by assuming that growth and abundance benefited everyone to a
greater extent "than before," whatever that is.
B. The Constitutionalist Critique
The school of constitutionalists has a few representatives among
those teaching in law schools but is larger amongst "purer" histori-
ans. This school has arisen since the Second World War essentially
in reaction to New Deal-consensus thought and to the latter's em-
phasis on the importance of economics. Its adherents are usually
middle-of-the-road to somewhat-tight-lipped-conservative in their
politics; they usually disavow economic determinism in favor of an
openly idealistic approach to the interpretation of history. Follow-
ing Bernard Bailyn es and Gordon Wood, 69 constitutionalist scho-
lars find the chief motivating factor in the American experience to
be ideas, particularly great constitutional principles; their pivot in
history is the American colonial experience culminating in the
Revolution, whence derived "those moral values that are embodied
in the fundamental principles of legality, . . . a deep respect for
the fundamental worth and dignity of all persons, and. . . a cen-
tral commitment to the ideals of equality, fairness, justice, and
freedom from arbitrary control. '7 0 Unleashed by these powerful
ideas, constitutionalists assert that the Revolution unleashed many
new ideas and created many new conditions.
68. See, e.g., B. BAiLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
69. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
70. Teachout, supra note 9, at 287.
71. Principles and ideas are so important to some constitutionalists that they find it diffi-
cult to accept any notion of "instrumental" activity by judges. John Phillip Reid, for exam-
ple, takes an article by Scheiber, which argued (contrary to Horwitz) that the instrumental
mode persisted long beyond the Civil War, see Scheiber, Instrumentalism and Property
Rights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of Judicial Reasoning" in the 19th Cen-
tury, 1975 WIs. L. REV. 1, 10 n.43, 12, as demonstrating that the concept of instrumentalism
itself was "questionable." Reid then criticizes Horwitz for "continu[ing] to believe there was
an era of instrumentalism." Reid, supra note 3, at 1310. For Reid's adherence to the Bailyn
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Thus, according to John Phillip Reid's critical review, "[t]he
transformation of American law about which Professor Horwitz
writes... [arose] out of the related transformation of the Ameri-
can economy produced by independence from Great Britain and
the concurrent industrial revolution, '72 the latter factor treated by
Reid as subordinate and determined by other factors. Reid says at
another point:
The great burst of judicial energy that characterized the pre-
Civil War decades was due . . . to the fact that a new nation
needed new law, or because it was an epoch when questions were
for the first time being asked and, by the very nature of things,
many innovative decisions were certain to be made.73
The principled motivations of those who made their marks as
actors in history are also quite important to the constitutionalists,
as therein lies the evidence of the importance of fundamentals.
Never mind that this approach limits us by and large to that small
segment of the population that was literate, had the leisure and
the inclination to record their feelings, and was fortunate enough
to have had succeeding generations recognize that what they had
done was important enough to have preserved those remains.
Never mind that they may have had conscious or subconscious rea-
sons for putting down less than or more than what actually hap-
pened. Never mind that each actor in history has only a partial
and biased view of events no matter how important he or she may
have been. "It is, of course, asking too much of the new legal his-
torians that they take men at their own word," Reid expostulates.7 4
Thus, he agrees with Horwitz that
many who thought in the Hamiltonian tradition preferred to
have questions about private property and vested rights settled
not by the legislature but by the judiciary, [but] their reasons
analysis, see J. REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE: THE CONDITIONS OF LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS BAY,
THE IRISH COMPARISON, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1977); Holt, "We
Are All Latent Tories'? (Book Review), 3 ALSA F., May 1978, at 45-51.
72. Reid, supra note 3, at 1312. I have transposed Reid's negatively phrased construction
here, and in the text accompanying the next footnote, to a positive construction without, I
think, changing his meaning.
73. Id. at 1310.
74. Id. at 1314 n.17.
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were due to legal ideology, not the fear that property might be
redistributed. . . . It was the doctrine-the idea-not the im-
plementation that troubled conservative lawyers.7 5
Ideological determinism, using principles derived from the Revolu-
tionary experience, constitutes the answer to historical puzzles:
The demise of employer paternalism may have been due as
much to the rise of urbanism as to the scheming friends of busi-
ness who sat on nineteenth-century courts. It may also have
been due to .. .the stress by the courts upon individual free-
dom, a legal doctrine then attributed to the winning of indepen-
dence from Great Britain. Employing only evidence available in
this book, it is possible to argue that even ...the fellow-ser-
vant doctrine. . . followed inevitably from the principles of the
American Revolution. . . .[N]ow the individual, free to enter or
to reject a perilous employment, was made responsible for his
own decisions .7
The constitutionalists do not, of course, see themselves so nar-
rowly. They accuse Horwitz of doctrinairely marching to the tune
of "a single set of ideological coordinates," while they see them-
selves as "constantly judging and discriminating, . .. responding
.. .to the whole of human experience. '77 Anyone who wishes to
point to factors other than ideological, however, is a victim of
"Horwitzian determinism," or rather is "a neomarxist on the scent
of an economic explanation. '7 8 Economic determinism is evil, while
neutrality (meaning the well-principled intentions of historical ac-
tors) is unquestionably good. "There is no neutrality in the legal
history of Horwitz. Economics determines all issues, conspiracy ex-
plains most events. '79
A "conspiracy" exists when a group attempts to influence events
because of evil (meaning economic) motivations. But it is neither
conspiratorial nor deterministic, apparently, for Reid to assert that
75. Id. at 1314.
76. Id. at 1317 (footnote omitted).
77. Teachout, supra note 9, at 246.
78. Reid, supra note 3, at 1313, 1317.
79. Id. at 1315. "It is this 'neutrality,' 'comprehensiveness,' and 'breadth of sympathy'
. . .that we expect and need from historical writing. And it is precisely this quality that,
because of its ideological preconceptions, new school historiography [i.e., Horwitz] fails to
provide." Teachout, supra note 9, at 280 n.131.
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the courts were. . opening opportunity to a wider class of citi-
zens. If the new law encouraged individuals to employ their in-
telligence and inventiveness unencumbered by restraints previ-
ously protective of those possessing vested privileges or lacking
in venturesomeness, the purpose of that new law can be as fairly
labelled "democratic" as "Machiavellian."80
The constitutionalists cannot accept that new shackles for large
numbers of people might have been substituted by the new order
in place of the old restraints, or that the new "contractarian" no-
tions of "individual freedom" might have been shams in practice
for many without the means or luck to employ them. Problems of
class struggle, if they ever existed on this side of the Atlantic and
above the Caribbean, were for constitutionalists whisked away by a
Revolution that saw most Americans united against their British
oppressors on matters of principle which transcended and obliter-
ated most petty economic grievances. Americans were blessed with
liberty, justice, and rights under a benign rule of law (and a duly
restrained government with fragmented power), which represented
the actuality of existence for most people.81 Beginning from such a
principled consensus,
the changes that Horwitz traces in pre-Civil War law, .. taken
individually,... can only be "interpreted as efforts to free the
economy from legal restrictions no longer relevant to American
society. Surely at the time they seemed to promise neutral
results....
Who can say that contemporaries expected that these changes
in law would result in the "subsidization" of a commercial class
and the economic domination by a favored few? Far more likely
it was contemplated that everyone would, to some extent, be a
"winner. '82
Individual motivations and constitutional principles remain, to the
end, the only salient factors involved in history. The constitution-
alists' ideologically deterministic explanations are, as a result,
80. Reid, supra note 3, at 1318.
81. "It is a simple empirical truth," the constitutionalist Teachout apparently believes,
"that where there is genuine respect for the rule of law and the principles that underlie it,
brutality and oppression cannot survive." Teachout, supra note 9, at 280.
82. Reid, supra note 3, at 1319-20.
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quite hollow, and their "Who would've guessed?" theory of the ad-
vent of vast economic disparities, political control exerted by a "fa-
vored few," and social degradation and misery for countless people
is unconvincing.
It is significant that these constitutionalists make no attempt to
prove or suggest that the kinds of changes which Horwitz demon-
strates to have occurred in private law did not occur, or occurred
in some other fashion for different reasons than those advanced by
Horwitz, and with nonredistributive results. The constitutionalists,
like most idealists, operate with their heads in the sand, ridiculing
the notion of deep social division and conflict because their frame
of understanding does not admit of its possibility. Their compla-
cency rests upon twin unproven hopes, or, shall we say, predictions
about the past. First, and most important, they posit, life in the
United States existed as a matter of everyday fact for the over-
whelming majority of its citizens under the operation of a rule of
law, implying that a fair and neutral governmental structure har-
moniously presided over the distribution of substantial justice and
guaranteed to them the rights and liberties which the Revolution
supposedly was fought over. Second, and in part as a result of the
first, the vast majority of citizens actually received some of the
fruits of abundance and growth, while most of those who at-
tempted to exercise their "intelligence and inventiveness" were re-
warded with larger pieces of the pie; further, the amounts of these
dividends increased with the economy. Thus, the constitutionalists
conclude, there could have been no reason for any social division of
great magnitude to have occurred.
After the 1970's, perhaps the twilight of legitimacy for the Amer-
ican government, the failure of both of these prongs of the Ameri-
can dream has become evident. "The rule of law" has been demon-
strated to have been a myth;83 fairness and justice do not
characterize the workings of the system at least in this century;8
83. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW passim, esp. 105 (1977); R. UNGER,
supra note 19.
84. See, e.g., J. AUERSACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976); R. HARRIS, FREEDOM SPENT. TALES OF TYRANNY IN AMERICA (1976); LAW
AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTiFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS (R. Lefcourt ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE]; M. LEVINE, POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN
AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION (1971); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
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the existence of deep social divisions has begun to be noticed by
scholars working in the Revolutionary, 5 "middle,"86 Reconstruc-
tion,8 7 and Progressive 8 periods of American history; and the pie
which we supposedly have been given larger pieces of has proven
to be plastic, poisonous, and increasingly devoid of any nourishing
content.89 The theory of Horwitz, which takes conflict into account
and which explains the existence of bias in the law, provides a
much more convincing account than does constitutionalism.
C. The Orthodox Critique
The orthodox school, typified usually by the writings of Roscoe
Pound, originated in the period of the rise of lawyers to organized
professional status (and the rise of law teaching to a separate pro-
fession) in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first
two decades of the twentieth. Having few adherents today (but
perhaps growing rapidly), it shares the idealism of the constitu-
tionalists, differing from them only in that it focuses on the com-
mon law as its central idea rather than on those constitutional
principles which came to flower because of the Revolution. The
history of humans is, to the orthodox, essentially a history of the
development of ideas and clusters of ideas. If not timeless, these
ideas certainly are understood to have a life of their own somehow
THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1975).
85. See, e.g., D. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION (1980); D. HOERDER, CROWD ACTION I REV-
OLUTIONARY MASSACHUSETTS, 1765-1780 (1977); S. LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1967); E. FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1976);
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF AmERICAN RADICALISM (A.
Young ed. 1976).
86. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, supra note 32; A. DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUS-
TRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN (1976); H. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN INDUSTRIAL-
IZING AMERICA (1976) (also deals with the Reconstruction period).
87. See, e.g., M. SCHWARTZ, RADICAL PROTEST AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: THE SOUTHERN
TENANT FARMERS' ALLIANCE AND COTTON TENANCY, 1880-1890 (1976); J. MANDLE, THE ROOTS
OF BLACK POVERTY: THE SOUTHERN PLANTATION ECONOMY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1978); M.
DUBOFSKY, INDUSTRIALISM AND THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1865-1920 (1975); J. WIENER, SOCIAL
ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH: ALABAMA 1860-1885 (1978).
88. See, e.g., G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERI-
CAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); M. DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD (1969). See also W. WILLIAMS, THE GREAT EVASION (1974).
89. See C. LASCH, supra note 17, and other works cited there.
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independent of and above society and human actors. Such con-
cepts motivate and impel human action, as humans adapt them-
selves to and attempt to complete the concepts.
Concepts such as the common law are thought by the orthodox
to be neutral and to grow (influenced at a great remove by slow
and widely-shared changes in human custom) according to their
own internal needs on a course charted by logic and reason, which
are "assumed to be [themselves] governed by historically unchang-
ing criteria."90 When legal historians assert that changes in the law
are a product of social forces rather than the result of logic and
reason, they begin "to undermine the indispensable premise . . .
that its characteristic modes of reasoning and its underlying sub-
stantive doctrines may not be universal or necessary, but rather
particular and contingent." '91
Randall Bridwell denies both that judges made law and that
contemporary socioeconomic conditions or interest groups had
much of an effect on the law. He conceives of the law as "a largely
self ordering system supportive of autonomous individual behavior
and experiment, adjusting itself with the aid of limited judicial in-
tervention that does not effectively elevate the narrow interests of
'caste or class.' ,,92 "Autonomous individual behavior" is custom,
the "vast universe of private activity" which assumes "modes or
patterns" that change "as society itself changes."983 The judicial
discretion permitted by the law "entailed the identification and
elimination of inconsistencies in the judicial record,"9' that is to
say only the weeding out of mistakes, a technique whose use would
be compelled to cease when "the contours of the positive rule...
fully emerged [from] previous cases."95 Bridwell points out, how-
90. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 278.
91. Id. at 281.
92. Bridwell, supra note 9, at 496. See also Gordon, supra note 51, at 1028-36.
93. Bridwell, supra note 9, at 464. Bridwell allows that "new custom" could be proved as
such, id. at 470, but does not tell us how common law judges could discern true custom from
temporary aberration.
94. Id. at 460.
95. Id. at 464 n.47. In the same note Bridwell explains that "the cases contained built in
limitations which emerged as the judicial acknowledgement of common law rules progressed
to the state where the statements of positive law contained in the case was [sic] thoroughly
settled." Id. Neither of these statements, nor any other that I can find in Bridwell's long
article, answers the question of where the first cases and rules came from; cases, rules, and
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ever, that "[tihe actual rule is nowhere personified or ever per-
fectly circumscribed into an inflexible definition."96 Thus, while
"the common law process" has the "essential capacity to reach
ever more mature stages of development" by producing an increas-
ingly "effectively inclusive or complete articulation of the stan-
dards" and by extending rules to other subject-matter areas, this
process is limited by custom and existing precedent and was
"largely based upon the continuous recognition of an ongoing order
of actions which judicial action only touched upon intermittently,
and in a fashion supportive of the ongoing order." 97 Rules are sepa-
rate entities which define themselves to be complete; inconsisten-
cies are obvious because of the law's internal logic; and the whole
"process" is "supportive of the ongoing order." In Bridwell's view,
Horwitz mistakes the ordinary limited discretion of the common-
law process for "instrumentalism" because he has not studied suffi-
ciently deeply to understand the continuities involved and to see
how already developed principles were merely being extended and
adapted to new evidence of custom.
Bridwell's theory that judges act only or primarily to flesh out,
to apply, or to extend legal rules because of the very existence of
the rules and of an "ongoing order" fails to convince "on two ac-
counts. First, the underlying assumption that society is an essen-
tially harmonious and consensus-oriented entity whose history ex-
tends immemorially into the past directly ignores the possibility of
social disruption and disharmony. Second, judges do not seem to
act in the fashion he postulates. In Transformation Horwitz
presents evidence contrary to both of Bridwell's assumptions. In
the crucible, Bridwell is able in a forty-five page article to present
the law are assumed by the orthodox to exist. Bridwell does acknowledge that the narrow
range of discretion was necessary "for the adjustment of rule to practice," but his extraordi-
nary idealism is demonstated by his conception of what would have existed in the absence
of discretion: this necessary "adjustment ... would have to have been self-executing." Id.
at 470. Ideas would correct themselves, without human intervention, and judges would be
reduced to mere mouthpieces for the law!
96. Id. at 464. For the orthodox, rules are not only hard to pin down; they obey something
like the Heisenberg principle, in that the very attempt to measure them is disturbing to
them. "[A]lmost any attempt to isolate legal or Constitutional phenonmena [sic] rends the
'seamless webb' [sic] of history and to some degree inevitably distorts the truth." Id. at 451
n.8.
97. Id. at 465, 466.
1982]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
no convincing evidence that Horwitz is wrong.9 8 The best he can do
is to tell us that the job is difficult:
Admittedly, phenomena such as "judicial discretion" are not
easily quantified .... The ability of a prevalent decisional tech-
nique to accomplish extensive and profound doctrinal change
and still remain the same technique or constitutional common
law process is an exceedingly complex phenomenon to under-
stand .... Horwitz's book adds little to our understanding of
this process, and at most presents largely unsupported conclu-
sions with a mere description of doctrinal change, sometimes
stated inaccurately. [99]
[T]he application of some quite familiar techniques for analysis
of legal data [would] enable Professor Horwitz to derive a more
defensible and more accurate meaning from it .... A simple
consideration of implicit principles common to a wide variety of
case data would have disclosed certain general consistent "theo-
ries" in the case law itself, which would in turn explain what
specifically appears to be "transformation."' 10
Bridwell cites no substantive cases and gives no "general consis-
tent theories" to refute Horwitz's massively presented documenta-
tion of legal change over an eighty-year period in several major
subject-matter areas. His orthodox ideological-deterministic argu-
ment is merely asserted.
Ironically, it is Bridwell who castigates Horwitz for selective use
of the material,10 1 and the empty irony of the orthodox critique is
compounded by the following remarkable charge: "The conspirato-
rial antics of the great mass of the American judiciary, glancing
sidelong at one another as they step in unison to gratify big busi-
ness by consciously overthrowing the private law of the country is
somehow a spectacle which one finds difficult to accept without
some real proof." 02 Why are not the actions of judges (robbed of
any independent use of their intelligence, it is true) who adhere to
98. Bridwell does spend 20 tedious pages on one attempt at disproof, which will be
treated in the succeeding section of this essay; his convoluted and difficult argument is not
very convincing.
99. Id. at 495.
100. Id. at 493-94.
101. These castigations occur frequently. See, e.g., id. at 494.
102. Id. at 472.
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custom and precedent in the common-law process equally "con-
spiratorial?" Do not Bridwell's judges "step in unison," only to a
different tune? Immediately preceding the passage last quoted,
Bridwell notes that the common-law judges rode herd on each
other-"no judge or group of judges could escape the matrix of
rules being observed by the greater number";103 are these not
"sidelong glances" of people "consciously" in lock-step? Conspir-
acy is not conspiracy when it is a consensus, apparently.
A variant of the orthodox argument, smugly produced by law-
and-economist Stephen Williams, supplies a large gap in Bridwell's
scheme by identifying the mode by which custom is taken into ac-
count by common-law judges. No conspiracy indeed, it is all a mat-
ter of utilitarian efficiency, which, Williams is sure, is timeless and
neutral, not an approach invented in the late eighteenth century as
a way of justifying contemporary value judgments. The "thread of
utilitarianism stretches back into the remotest reaches of Anglo-
American law, ' 10 4 he asserts, utilitarian language coming more into
use post Bentham, "seep[ing] into judicial opinions . . . thereaf-
ter. 1 0 5 Effortlessly ignoring Horwitz's identification of instrumen-
talism with bias and partiality, Williams transmogrifies the overt
attempt of the judges to stimulate growth into a neutral, natural
application of standards of efficiency. Courts are supposed to aid
growth: "The central problem is one of assuring that rights be
readily marketable-a prerequisite if private rights in property are
to allocate resources efficiently."106 Indeed, courts always did,
though they may have been ignorant of what they were doing:
[W]e may note some general reasons for skepticism about the
idea that pre-"transformation" law was innocent of utilitarian
goals .... [I]t seems scarcely credible that society could long
exist without viewing a goal of maximizing aggregate utility...
as at least relevant to a substantial number of cases....
... [S]o many legal justifications preceding utilitarian analy-
sis are patently tautological ... [that] it seems natural to sup-
pose that the utility of the rule, rather than the tautological
103. Id.
104. Williams, supra note 9, at 1187.
105. Id. at 1201.
106. Id. at 1198.
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mumbo-jumbo, was the true source of the judicial decision."0 7
Utilitarian efficiency itself has here become the timeless central
idea of orthodoxy, which, since it "seems natural," is assumed not
to be partial or economically biased.
The members of orthodoxy want to shut out from their con-
sciousness any possibility that law might be partisan, produced by
political efforts to achieve the interests of this or that segment of
the social whole. l08 They ignore the desires and demands of any
segment of the population that is not "supportive of the ongoing
order," and elevate the partisan results of social interaction and
coercive governmental behavior into immemorial custom or utilita-
rian efficiency supposedly understood and voluntarily adhered to
by all. Ideas enable the orthodox to ignore the realities of discord
and social struggle, but, like all liberals, they bottom their under-
standing and approach upon an assumed consensus.10 9 They too
107. Id. at 1202.
108. The Maitre de ballet of law-and-economics has recently "come out of the closet" of
scientistic neutrality, arguing in two recent articles that utilitarian efficiency is utilized by
courts to maximize the wealth of the wealthy. See Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis
of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487 (1980); Pos-
ner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979), criticized
aptly in Horwitz, Law and Economics, supra note 18 (the "closet" quote is from id. at 912).
It will be interesting to see whether this radical shift from neutralism to ideology will, as
Horwitz predicts, split apart the law-and-economics movement, but the event does provide
additional evidence for the thesis that the Rule of Law is rapidly crumbling. See generally
Holt, The Future of the Rule of Law Notes on Post-Liberal Jurisprudence (1981) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
The connection between Bridwell and the patriarch of the modern legal utilitarians,
Friedrich von Hayek, is noted by Sugarman, Theory and Practice, supra note 8, at 99 n.26.
109. Thus, Bridwell finds himself "more in agreement with Hurst" despite the latter's
determinism because, "contrary to Horwitz's view ... Hurst has consistently emphasized
broad popular support for legal change in America." Bridwell, supra note 9, at 492 n.118.
Reid, also representing an idealist school, similarly bridges the putatively immense chasm
between himself and the economic determinists: "In the legal history of Professor Hurst,
economic interests struggled against other economic interests. .. The courts acted as neu-
tral referees .... Hurst attributes the transformation ... to drift and inertia. . .."Reid,
supra note 3, at 1321. The primary factor in the analysis of all these superficially diverse
scholars is not their scholarly findings, not the theoretical framework (emphasizing ideas of
economics) within which those findings are located, but their aversion to the very mention
of social discord and divisions. Bridwell and Reid accuse Horwitz of tailoring his evidence to
fit preconceived theories, Reid, supra note 3, at 1317; Bridwell, supra note 9, at 492-93, but
it is evident that liberal scholars tailor their evidence to fit their theories too. Their work is
just as political as is the law they strive to see as neutral.
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have been unable to present any convincing arguments that the
doctrines of law which Horwitz demonstrates to have emerged in
the early national period of our history were not produced in an
"instrumental" fashion to serve partisan purposes, attempting to
aid certain segments of American society at the expense of others.
D. The Failure of Substantive Critiques
Three attempts have been made to gainsay Horwitz's reading of
the evidence from the nineteenth century. Two of these, by Ran-
dall Bridwell and Stephen Williams of the orthodox school, are
quite unconvincing. Bridwell fails to come to grips with the sub-
stance of Transformation, that is, Horwitz's thorough survey of the
basic areas of common-law adjudication to cull evidence of judicial
attempts to aid economic development. Bridwell essentially snipes
at flanks, choosing the adjective area of conflict of laws for the bur-
den of his refutation, and fighting on the territory of Swift v. Ty-
son,110 a decision which Horwitz does not proclaim to be openly
instrumental (since it was not). Rather, in a short discussion which
has met with the approval of other reviewers,"' Horwitz argues
that Justice Story disguised a prodevelopmental decision in neu-
tralistic, already outdated natural law theory, requiring federal di-
versity courts to apply general commercial rules favoring negotia-
bility rather than the peculiar New York rule which Tyson thought
applied, one which would have stanched negotiability.
Although it is hidden in a confused flurry of criticism and depre-
cation, 12 Bridwell's agreement with the prodevelopmental nature
both of Swift and of the general doctrines of commercial law
emerges from a close reading. "[E]verything practical encouraged
states to leave general commercial custom intact as they found it,"
110. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
111. The eight-page discussion of Swift (out of Horwitz's 348 pages), M. HoRwrrz, supra
note 1, at 245-52, 345-46, has been noted with approval by Horwitz critics Gilmore, supra
note 9, at 789-90, and Scheiber, supra note 9, at 461.
112. Bridwell variously accuses Horwitz of misunderstanding general commercial law
prevalent before the Civil War, misunderstanding the content and role of the conflicts rules
of the time, misinterpretation of the federal system of courts and of contemporary ideas of
federalism, oversimplification, selective use of evidence, and crudity of presentation; he con-
cludes, "All this is just about as wrong as it could be." Bridwell, supra note 9, at 473-92,
479.
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because such was supported by "the customary practices of innu-
merable private parties pursuing their own autonomous commer-
cial dealings."11 Bridwell even finds it "quite ordinary" that
judges would undertake "the gradual recognition of widely held
and objectively provable practices."114 It is surprisingly unsurpris-
ing to him that "decisions reflect the views and practices of the
majority of the commercial world."1 5 The world has become "the
commercial world," and only a "majority" of that; the only rele-
vant people are those with sufficient resources to pursue "autono-
mous commercial dealings." Bridwell's consensus underpinnings,
however, preclude his recognition of the partiality and bias of his
beliefs. His argument reduces to the naked assertion that Horwitz
must be wrong in attributing overt class bias to judges because it is
only natural for them to have followed "widely held" commercial
practices-and Bridwell makes this argument, significantly, with
regard to a case which does not contain the kind of openly devel-
opmental language Horwitz demonstrates in many other instances.
Williams attempts to show that the law in three ar-
eas-negligence, nuisance, and riparian rights-did not change as
drastically as Horwitz claims it did. In each instance his attempted
proof falls far short of being persuasive. Horwitz argues that the
advent of entrepreneurial capitalism persuaded many judges to in-
troduce an element of fault into torts, thus altering that field's the-
oretical basis from strict liability to negligence. The argument is
not new, but Charles 0. Gregory had urged that 1850 was the turn-
ing point,""' whereas Horwitz wishes to move the date back a half
century. Williams agrees with the contrary, idealistic argument of
E.F. Roberts that strict liability was never the rule, fault being re-
quired in accidental injury cases long before 1800.117 Williams finds
comfort in several early English cases, 18 but Horwitz had at-
113. Id. at 490-91. Mr. Tyson, who presumably was pursuing his own autonomous com-
mercial dealing, was apparently as wrong-headed as Horwitz was to prove to be: "It is diffi-
cult to imagine any real expectations Mr. Tyson might have had being defeated by the Swift
decision." Id. at 490 n.115.
114. Id. at 491.
115. Id.
116. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951).
117. Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory
Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191 (1965).
118. Williams, supra note 9, at 1190, 1215-18.
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tempted to reject the Roberts argument solely on the basis of
American cases.11 9 Williams, cites no American cases to refute Hor-
witz's claim that the American and British developments were dif-
ferent, quibbles with Horwitz's reading of several admittedly ob-
scure and difficult decisions, and concludes weakly and
idealistically that, "[a]fter looking at his core authorities, one
emerges suspecting that American law contained vast empty
reaches waiting to be filled. ' 120 The assertion that decisions which
dealt with contemporary problems in contemporary if obscure
terms are meaningless and "empty" not only fulfills the historian's
task poorly but also fails to convince that Horwitz is wrong.
Rather, one is moved to reject Williams's arguments instead.
One has seen Williams's strongest point by this time. He ad-
vances several arguments that might constitute exceptions to Hor-
witz's view of nuisance law, but admits that "it is hard to ascertain
the extent to which [these exceptions] may have commanded judi-
cial adherence at any given moment," and again fails to cite a sin-
gle American decision to refute Horwitz.1 21 Williams notes that
there are not a lot of cases to back up Horwitz's claim that riparian
law changed from a concept of natural flow to one of reasonable
use, in order to allow courts to interrupt stream flow for develop-
mental reasons, but again he cannot find much with which to dis-
pute Horwitz either, coming to rest on the assertion that "for all
their talk of 'balancing,' courts have very rarely denied relief to an
established user whose interests were substantially interfered with
by a newcomer. 11 22 The reason for 'Williams's production of
popguns when cannons were announced is not long in evidencing
itself: he agrees with development and, like Bridwell, finds it natu-
ral for courts to promote economic growth. "Surely the public pur-
pose is making possible the production that would have been fore-
closed if every adversely affected riparian owner were allowed an
injunctive remedy.1 23 If "maximizing aggregate utility" is the goal
of all sane judges, as Williams thinks it is,12' then one ought to
119. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 91 & n.156.
120. Williams, supra note 9, at 1193.
121. Id. at 1196.
122. Id. at 1199.
123. Id. at 1200.
124. Id. at 1202, discussed in text accompanying note 107 supra.
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expect very little substantive difference between Williams and
Horwitz with regard to the nineteenth century cases, and that is
what one finds.
The third criticism seems more formidable. In an urbane essay,
one of the doyens of contemporary English contractual legal his-
tory, A.W.B. Simpson, has disputed Horwitz on many significant
points in Transformation's study of contract law.125 While it has
proved beyond my competence to investigate the charges made, it
appears that Simpson's critique is not very forceful either. First,
Simpson lines himself up with the developmental idealism of
Bridwell and Williams: "many of the doctrines that [Horwitz]
identifies as characteristic of the transformation were common in
the eighteenth century. '126
Second, the British legal historian David Sugarman has investi-
gated some of the competing claims made by Horwitz and Simpson
about the history of contract law. Sugarman finds several substan-
tive and methodological flaws in Simpson's work which partially
undercut the force of Simpson's critique. If Sugarman is correct,
Simpson's criticisms carry significantly less force in important re-
spects than would otherwise be the case. Sugarman's work
12 7
should be published soon, but, given my sympathy with his previ-
ous conclusions, 28 I assume the correctness of his judgment in this
instance.
Third and most important, Betty Mensch has concluded that
the recent, massively detailed history of modern English contract
law (written by Oxford University Professor P.S. Atiyah, the other
doyen of English contractual legal history) "provides detailed and
convincing evidence that Horwitz was right"1 29 in his analysis of
doctrinal change, as distinct from the social and economic conclu-
sions to be drawn therefrom. Indeed, Atiyah acknowledges his debt
to Horwitz.130 Atiyah's undoubted orthodoxy on social and eco-
125. Simpson, supra note 9.
126. Id. at 542.
127. Sugarman, Horwitz, Simpson, Atiyah and the Transformation of Anglo-American
Law, in LAW AND ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 1750-1914 (forthcoming
1982).
128. See note 11 supra.
129. Mensch, supra note 52, at 756 n.9; see id. at 756-58, passim.
130. See, e.g., P. ATnmAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 566 n.5 (1979).
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nomic matters,13 1 plus his detailed doctrinal conclusions, confirm
both that Horwitz is essentially correct (at least in the realm of
contract law) and that Transformation cannot be dismissed as the
product of sheer prejudice or bias. Neither Simpson nor Williams
nor Bridwell has managed substantially to refute Horwitz's reading
of the nineteenth-century American cases.
E. Conclusion
The comparison of Transformation to the work of those who
have criticized it from the right has put into even starker, more
favorable contrast the signal achievement of Horwitz. He is willing
to accept that there might have been deep social and economic di-
visions in the American polity during the period 1780-1860, with
certain interest groups consistently getting the greater share of the
spoils from the struggle. He argues that this was both reflected in
and enhanced by changes in major doctrines of law, and that
judges and lawyers, far from being professionally neutral, allied
themselves with those who benefited, the rising entrepreneurial
and industrial capitalists. All legal historians of the three liberal
schools in current vogue, in their theories and in their research,
unquestioningly accept an underlying social consensus as a funda-
mental axiom. Some conventional legal historians are idealists, who
ignore or submerge economic and social factors; others are deter-
minists, who elevate economic factors to the front of analysis but
understand them only on the surface, failing to look beneath them
for the hidden interconnections and influences which demonstrate
deep tensions and conflicts of interests. All, however, as has been
shown, rest on consensus.3 2
A materialist view of history, carefully utilizing Marx's dialecti-
cal methodology,33 describes the past and present very differ-
131. Id. at 220-24, 389-90 (carefully adopting an orthodox political position).
132. Cf. Freeman, supra note 48, at 1233-34, 1236.
133. One cannot repeat too often that Marx's dialectical approach involves the rejection
of a familiar bourgeois way of looking at the world in favor of the development of a more
comprehensive, qualitative, substantive approach which, among other things, disavows the
liberal fact/value distinction and the liberal mode of definition-by-isolation. See B. OLLMAN,
ALIENATION, supra note 16, at 5-40, passim; notes 16, 64 & accompanying text supra;
Olman, Teaching Marxism, supra note 16, at 125, 126, 136:
[U]ndoubtedly the major hurdle in presenting Marxism ... is the bourgeois
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ently."' It discovers that humans have been in fundamental con-
flict in all of recorded history over the means available to
reproduce their daily lives in a physical sense ("the means of pro-
duction"), and that these conflicts take place between social groups
identifiable by their access to control of the means of production.
Those in control exploit the others, who must toil for the control-
lers. Those who do not have control wish to escape the oppressive-
ness of being subordinated to others and the deprivation of the
products of their labor, in order to satisfy their own needs. Chief
among these needs is to retain and fulfill the basic attributes of
humanity, to attain "the full and free development of every
individual.' 113 5
Different "modes" of production, or methods of extracting labor
from workers, have existed at different times. The present epoch is
one of capitalism; the workers create and donate surplus value to
capitalists essentially through a process of mystification rather
than one involving brute force or fear. Workers consent to the sys-
tem because they are supposedly free to contract with employers
for their labor-time, inequalities of bargaining power being success-
ideology, the systematic biases and blind spots, which even the most radical
bring with them.... Underpinning and providing a framework for all [bour-
geois biases and blind spots] is an undialectical, factoral mode of thinking that
separates events from their conditions, people from their real alternatives and
human potential, social problems from one another, and the present from the
past and the future. The organizing and predisposing power of this mode of
thought is such that any attempt to . . .present a Marxist analysis of any
event is doomed to distortion and failure unless accompanied by an equally
strenuous effort to impart the dialectical mode of reasoning .... It is impor-
tant. . .[to] see that formal education in America is in large part training in
how to think undialectically.
134. Marx was especially careful to oppose idealism:
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but its direct
opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of
thinking, which under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an in-
dependent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is
only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary,
the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind,
and translated into forms of thought.
1 K. MARx, CAPiTAL, supra note 23, at 19. While this quote may be taken to reinforce a
deterministic version of the "structure"-"superstructure" dichotomy, see note 14 & accom-
panying text supra, it appears to me that Marx is linking together the mind and the mate-
rial world rather than disjoining them.
135. Id. at 592.
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fully hidden behind the appearance of fairness and freedom. The
mystification resonates throughout the culture of the capitalist so-
cial system. Inequalities in access to power are successfully hidden
within structures of liberal democracy, constitutionalism, and the
rule of law.136 Inequalities in access to satisfaction of needs are suc-
cessfully hidden within a flood of consumer products, the availabil-
ity of stock ownership, welfare supports and other governmental
redistributive schemes, and belief in freedom of opportunity. Class
lines are blurred, and struggle is defused or deflected, as most peo-
ple are unable fully to sense their own objective interests resulting
from their objective economic situation.13 7 Ideologues, such as his-
torians, reproduce the mystification by investigating only the ap-
pearances, accepting without question such fundamental liberal
notions as consensus when the existence of consensus is what they
should be questioning scientifically.
Horwitz has radically broken with liberal legal history and its
mystifying categories and assumptions. He has demonstrated the
bias of law and law-people in the period 1780-1860, destroying the
myth of the neutrality of law and opening the way for the study of
law as an active element of human socioeconomic history in the
manner of E.P. Thompson,38 Eugene Genovese, 3 Douglas Hay,40
and Staughton Lynd,14 among others.14 2 Transformation ranks
136. Cf. Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307, 1347-50 (1979).
137. The two-class model used by Marx may be better understood, to the extent it might
be thought to be descriptive of contemporary social formations, as a metaphor rather than
as an objective reality. Marx wrote during a time when capital and labor stood blankly op-
posed to each other, snarling across a rather clearly defined abyss. Proletarian conditions
today form a part of almost everyone's objective experience. See works cited in note 17
supra.
138. See E. THOMPSON, WHiGS AND HUNTERS, esp. 245-69 (1975).
139. See E. GENOVESE, supra note 32, esp. 25-49.
140. See Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in D. HAY et al., ALBmON'S FA-
TAL TREE 17-63 (1975). Hay is critiqued in Sugarman, Theory and Society, supra note 8,
passim.
141. See, e.g., Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald
Cox, 4 INDUs. REL. L.J. 483 (1981); Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo
Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 (1979); Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activ-
ity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975).
142. See, e.g., LAw AGANST Tm PEOPLE, supra note 84; Glasbeek & Rowland, Are Injur-
ing and Killing at Work Crimes?, 17 0SGOODE HALL L.J. 506 (1979); Klare, Judicial Deradi-
calization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,
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(with Mark Tushnet's recent book The American Law of Slav-
ery 1 3) as the most suggestive, comprehensive, and sustained work
to be produced by the critical legal theory movement of aware legal
scholars which has emerged in the past five years.14 4 The product
of a slow but steady disaffection with bourgeois historiography and
politics, it is and should remain a model for us all and a monument
to the struggle toward demystification which most of us must go
through.
Nevertheless, problems remain with Transformation as an ex-
emplar of materialist history. In much of his methodology, in most
of his explicit efforts at summary and analysis, and in many of the
attitudes he exhibits, Horwitz did not effect the same radical break
with the premises of liberal legal history as do the impact and ap-
proach of the volume as a whole. While, as noted before, 145 many
of the aspects of materialist historiography are subjects of consid-
erable debate and part of the problem can be attributed to a simi-
lar retention of aspects of liberal ways of thinking, the attempt to
delineate some of these problems may help to reduce the occur-
rence of similar confusion and, thus, to accelerate the advance of
materialist scholarship.
IV. TiHE PROBLEMS WITH Transformation
A. The History of Capitalism
Two common misconceptions about the past mar Transforma-
tion. One may be called the "golden era" error, and the other con-
62 MINN. L. R v. 265 (1978); Ravitz, Reflections of a Radical Judge: Beyond the Courtroom,
in v ERDicTS ON LAWYERS 255, 255-68 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976); Wexler, Practicing
Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); P. Gabel, The Social Psychology of Law and
Legal Process (1981) (unpublished doctoral dissertation).
143. M. TUSHNET, THE AmERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMAN-
ITY AND INTEREST (1981).
144. A Conference on Critical Legal Studies was organized in 1977, when few of its mem-
bers were Marxists. A majority of the participants in the 1982 meeting of the Conference in
Cambridge appeared to be Marxists. Many of its members, and some others, consider them-
selves to be a part of a critical legal theory movement. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 1275;
Freeman, supra note 48. While Business Week's estimate of 10,000 Marxists now teaching
at the college level or above is obviously overdrawn, there has been a significant growth of
materialist membership on university faculties and particularly in law schools in very recent
times. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 25, 1982, at 42-45.
145. See notes 13-16 & accompanying text supra.
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cerns the dating of the advent of capitalism. Many historians who
perceive conflict and social tension in a given period will conclude
that it represents a declension from a previous time when harmony
prevailed. 146 At points, Horwitz describes- life in colonial America
as though a real consensus existed then, in a socially undifferenti-
ated world free from class struggle. "[V]iolations of the tort law
were [then] universally regarded as unjustified and antisocial acts,"
he says; "[1]aw [was] once conceived of as protective, regulative,
paternalistic and, above all, a paramount expression of the moral
sense of the community, . . . [of] the legal and ethical culture of
the small town, of the farmer, and of the small trader. 14 7 The
reader is led to conclude that capitalism reared its ugliness only
with the advent of an outburst of entrepreneurship in the 1790's.
At other points in Transformation, however, there are overtones
of a different analysis, where colonial law is said to reflect the in-
terests of "[t]he great English gentry, who had played a central
role" in shaping it. 4" As Simpson observes:
A Marxist might have argued that the English commercial bour-
geoisie, linked with elements of the landed classes, forged an
equitable theory of contract in the eighteenth century as a
weapon in their struggle with a law reflecting earlier, less com-
mercial times; and that once it triumphed, the new order cut
back on the dangerous legal doctrines it had used against the
old.149
McClain is in accord: "the class which created the common law
and was most protected by it was the class at the top of the hierar-
chy-the English landed aristocracy."1 10 As Genovese has noted,
"Historically, private property has meant bourgeois property ....
The early advance of capitalism may, therefore, be measured by
the doctrinal advance of 'absolute' property, most notably in
land."' 5' Rather than the advent of capitalism, Transformation
concerns a change from one form of it to another. Eric Foner sums
146. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, supra note 84.
147. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 81, 253, 186.
148. Id. at 36.
149. Simpson, supra note 9, at 535-36.
150. McClain, supra note 9, at 396; accord, e.g., Gilmore supra note 9, at 794; Winship,
supra note 9, at 754; Bloomfield, supra note 9, at 1107.
151. Genovese, supra note 8, at 732 (footnote omitted).
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it up: "what Horwitz is describing is precisely a change from what
[C.B.] Macpherson calls 'possessive individualism,' in which prop-
erty is valued primarily as a guarantee of individual autonomy, to
a market view of property as a means to economic development
and capital accumulation.' '152
Marx insisted that "the modern history of capital dates from the
creation in the 16th century of a world-embracing commerce and a
world-embracing market,' 5 3 with "the first beginnings of capitalist
production as early as the 14th or 15th century.' ' 54 England led
the way. The British North American colonies were settled as "col-
onies," and were treated as such by the mother country. While
much of the settlement had an enduring frontier quality, there
eventually developed major cities where many people engaged in
commerce (and even banking), and The Legal Papers of John Ad-
ams, among other sources, make clear that emerging elitist and
professionalistic groups of lawyers in the urban centers were begin-
ning to devote themselves at least in part to the affairs of business-
men long before 1800.155 Poverty and wretchedness existed both in
the countryside and in the cities, and increasingly after 1700 infla-
tion was a major problem, particularly during the crises which led
to the Revolution. 156 Social historian Edward Pessen's recent con-
clusions deserve quotation at length:
A dramatic inequality of condition long antedated Tocqueville's
visit to America .... In the century prior to the American
Revolution, colonies in every geographical section of British
North America witnessed the emergence of families possessed of
substantial real and personal property.... American communi-
152. Foner, supra note 8, at 38; C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKS (1962); cf. 1 K. MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 23, at 89:
Man has often made man himself, under the form of slaves, serve as the primi-
tive material of money, but has never used land for that purpose. Such an idea
could only spring up in a bourgeois society already well developed. It dates
from the last third of the 17th century ....
153. Id. at 146.
154. Id. at 715. See also S. COHN, THE LABORING CLASSES IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE
(1980).
155. See generally, e.g., THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS (3 vols., L. Wroth & H. Zobel
eds. 1965); Klein, The Rise of the New York Bar: The Legal Career of William Livingston,
in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 392 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969); G. NASH, THE
URBAN CRUCIBLE (1979).
156. See D. HOERDER, supra note 85, passim.
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ties without exception witnessed increasing concentration or
maldistribution of wealth with the passage of time. . . . [I]n al-
most every colony a small, wealthy ruling class "dominated the
local political machinery [and] filled all or nearly all the impor-
tant local offices". . . . It is a fair summary that over the course
of the colonial era several thousand families, constituting less
than one percent of the American population, had amassed great
riches based on diverse sources, lofty social prestige and a near
monopoly of influence and power which they appear to have re-
garded both as a fitting recognition of their possessions and emi-
nence and as a means of promoting their own personal interests
and those of their class. 157
The Salem witch craze, the "Regulator" movements in
backcountry Carolina before the Revolution, and the rebellions,
such as Shays', that flared up in the 1780's and 1790's against the
new regime, demonstrate the potential for social unrest and class
division. 15s While capitalism may have entered a period of rapid
entrepreneurial growth in the United States with the advent of na-
tionhood, it was the dominant mode of sociopolitical relations long
before 1800, with concomitant crises, social struggle, and the bi-
ased use of law to aid elites. There was no "golden" colonial era,
except in Pessen's sense.
B. The Organic Nature of Capitalist Culture
Capitalism is a way of life, not merely a set of economic relation-
ships. The particular mode of production of any epoch infuses and
is infused by a concomitant organic culture, an interrelated, possi-
bly internally contradictory, but characteristic complex of institu-
tions, feelings, habits, beliefs, interpretations, morals, and
157. Pessen, Wealth in America Before 1865, in WEALTH AND THE WEALTHY IN THE MOD-
ERN WORLD 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 174-75 (W. Rubenstein ed. 1980).
158. For the Salem witch craze, see P. BOYER & S. NISSENBAUM, SALEM POSSESSED: THE
SocIAL ORIGINS OF WITCHCRAFT (1974); D. KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHU-
s~rrs: EssEx COUNTY, 1629-1692, at 3-34, 158-91 (1979). See generally M. HARRIS, COWS,
PIGS, WARS AND WITCHES (1974). For the Regulator movement, see M. Kay, The Institu-
tional Background to the Regulation in North Carolina (1962) (unpublished doctoral disser-
tation, University of Minnesota), M. KAY, THE NORTH CAROLINA REGULATORS, 1766-1776
(forthcoming), and J. Whittenburg, Backwoods Revolutionaries: Social Context and Consti-
tutional Theories of the North Carolina Regulators, 1765-1771 (1974) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Georgia). For Shays' Rebellion, see D. SZATmARY, supra note 85.
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doctrines:
According to Marx, social conditions determine character, both
directly, through their effect on the individual's powers and
needs, and indirectly, through the creation of interests which he
then strives to satisfy. . . .The visible result is a psychological
and ideological superstructure which is practically the same for
all men caught up in a given set of material relations.
159
For most people, the result is internalized and is only partially
consciously perceived to be a peculiar, historically specific phenom-
enon; during the heyday of capitalism, most people feel that the
capitalist ethos is "natural." It is not a surface, intellectual brush
with ideas; an individual's whole approach to and appreciation of
the world-his or her emotions, perceptions, speech, and
thought-are influenced and formed by the underlying material re-
lations. They are the way she or he understands reality.160
Horwitz notes that the instrumental mode of decisionmaking re-
shaped some rules "before new or special economic or technological
pressure for change in the law . . . emerged." 161 He explains this
159. B. OLLMAN, ALIENATION, supra note 16, at 120. Marx stated this truth as follows:
Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence,
rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, il-
lusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms
them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social rela-
tions. The single individual, who derives them through tradition and upbring-
ing, may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting point of his
activity.... [A]s in private life one differentiates between what a man thinks
and says of himself and what he really is and does, so in historical struggles
one must distinguish still more the phrases and fancies of parties from their
real organism and their real interests, their conception of themselves, from
their reality.
K. MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF Louis BONAPARTE 47 (Int'l Pub. ed. New York
1963) (1st ed. 1852) [hereinafter cited as K. MARX, EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE]. Closely related
to this is the "structure"-"superstructure" problem. See note 14, & text accompanying notes
13-16 & 145 supra.
160. Christopher Lasch reaffirms that "social patterns reproduce themselves in personal-
ity." C. LASCH, supra note 17, at 50-51. Mark Tushnet terms this a "psychology of ideology
which . . .has been neglected by prominent Marxist scholars until recently[:] . . .people
must interpret the material conditions of their existence in ways that make their experience
coherent .... [T]he primary, though not exclusive, material conditions that shape interpre-
tations of the world are the material social relations of production." M. TuSHNaT, supra
note 143, at 31-32.
161. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 3.
1982] LEGAL HISTORY TRANSFORMATION 709
apparent cause-effect anomaly by postulating autonomous eco-
nomic interests peculiar to judges, lawyers, and "the law," uncon-
nected with the interests of entrepreneurial capitalism, which pro-
duced the changes before they were "necessary." As has been seen,
however, capitalism had been dominant in American social rela-
tions for a long time; it was "in the air." Judges, lawyers, and legal
commentators, formed psychologically and intellectually by and
caught up in the ethos of capitalism, would have some feeling for
"the way things ought to be," and could have in effect invented
solutions for problems which might not have yet occurred.1 6 2 Eco-
nomics and law, as ideological phenomena, interact not in a linear,
simple, one cause-one effect way, but in a complex, interrelated,
organic fashion.18 3
Another, more important consequence of the organic nature of
capitalism is a deeper perspective on the notion of "instrumental-
ism." Horwitz has argued in a linear cause-and-effect mode: "in-
strumentalism" rises to "dominance" after about 1820, being
phased out in favor of a newly-dominant "formalism" around 1860.
162. Organicism is not idealism in disguise; it is, however, the materialist posture of the
same perceptual mode. Idealists reify to abstraction, attempting (whether consciously or
not) to isolate the perceived phenomenon from its socioeconomic context. Materialists also
reify, but they refuse to disconnect their perceptions from each other and from the historic
social and economic matrix within which their origins, meanings, and consequences lie.
Much of the confusion at the heart of Davis, supra note 48, lies in its idealistic failure to
grasp this distinction. While phenomena persist after their matrix of genesis has subsided,
due to the collective existence of human mental capabilities such as memory, K. MARx,
EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE, supra note 159, at 15, and while humans strive not only to
reproduce themselves but also to escape the realm of "necessity and mundane considera-
tions" for the purpose of developing "human energy as an end in itself," 3 K. MARX, CAPI-
TAL, supra note 23, at 820, both of which render socioeconomic determination mediate
rather than immediate in many instances and produce "relative autonomy," the human situ-
ation is nevertheless still best understood materially, since "the true realm of freedom...
can blossom forth only with th[e] realm of necessity as its basis." Id.
163. The victory of economic subjectivism at law enormously strengthened its sup-
porters within the economics profession itself. The ideological struggle [over
the nature of contracts] within the legal profession may well have had as great
an impact upon economic thought as vice versa-economic thought appealing
to the newly prevailing subjectivism of legal doctrine as if all opposition had
been swept from the field, and legal thought increasingly resting its pretension
to science upon an economic reality perceived as pure market mechanism, but
in fact partly a result of the very legal intervention sanctioned by the economic
theory to which it was now appealing in the name of scientific objectivity.
Genovese, supra note 8, at 731-32.
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Since Transformation focuses almost exclusively on decisions from
the northeastern United States,"' that is, upon the region rapidly
undergoing capitalist development, variations from, or negations
of, the prescribed rise-dominance-fall pattern on some other re-
gional (or perhaps temporal) basis could be used as a solid argu-
ment for rejecting the Horwitz theory.
An organic approach might observe that the legal aspect of the
ethos of capitalism is positivism, and that legal positivism usually
has been expressed in one of two modes of judicial reason-
ing-instrumentalism or formalism-as demanded by material
conditions and the job to be accomplished. "Instrumentalism" is a
useful legal-positivist mode when a fundamental attack must be
made upon a received legal tradition, or where frontier conditions
exist. Thus, "instrumentalism" probably lasted long past 1860 on
the frontier and in frontier conditions or frontier areas of law,'6 5
and it was as useful in firming the foundations of emerging monop-
oly capital in the first four decades of this century (by a generation
of Legal Realists) as it had been in establishing the foundations of
entrepreneurial capital a hundred years before. Formalism, on the
other hand, as Horwitz says, never disappeared. It was always the
mode used-by the same judges-in public law and especially in
the constitutional law field. 66 We should not be surprised if both
coexisted, 167 perhaps sometimes being evidenced side by side in the
same opinion. In fact, while instrumentalism has enjoyed periods
164. As noted by, for example, Scheiber, supra note 9, at 462; Bloomfield, supra note 9, at
1106.
165. See Presser, supra note 4, at 721 n.69; Bloomfield, supra note 9, at 1106, 1107. See
generally Scheiber, supra note 71, esp. pp. 8, 10, 12, 13-17.
Compare the supporting view of periods of formalism and instrumentalism in Anglo-
American jurisprudence in Siegel, The Aristotelian Basis of English Law 1450-1800, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 18 (1981); S. Siegel, Perpetuities: A Study of the Substantive Impact of
Jurisprudential Thought 25-26 (to be published in 1982 in the Miami Law Review).
166. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 253-56. That the same judges were involved was noted
by Bloomfield, supra note 9, at 1104.
167. See Scheiber, supra note 71, at 5 (footnotes omitted):
[Although] American judges frequently rejected or modified common-law doc-
trines and precedent .... [they also] bent far ... to acknowledge the basic
validity of . . . "ancient English and American authorities".... American
judges felt constrained to cast emergent riparian law in the traditional frame-
work .... In the closely related field of eminent domain law, . . . judges con-
tinued to honor formalistic precedents that had relied upon higher-law notions
of inalienable property rights.
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of prominence, formalism was (and is) probably the "dominant"
mode, if such judgments be useful, because it provides the better
mystification within which economic interests can maneuver. An
organic culture can contain contradictory notions existing side by
side, both of which serve the dominant economic interests but in
very different ways.
Further, the "formalistic"-"instrumental" dichotomy is too
sharp, seeming to separate phenomena which actually perform
some similar functions. "Formalism" is instrumental, if by that
term we mean "activist," because it too allows judges leeway to
manipulate rules to achieve desired results. Scheiber points out
that "even when they posited formalist doctrines of higher law and
inalienable rights, post-1865 due process decisions favored" busi-
ness and economic growth.116 Moreover, "instrumentalism" is for-
malistic, if by that term we mean "false," since the biased nature
of judicial manipulation is still hidden. No instrumentalist judge
openly stated that his action was taken to benefit a small segment
of the population. Instrumental opinions are infused with some-
thing like the idea of consensus: economic growth is for the good of
all, and all really desire it. The judicial display of naked bias to-
ward any small, elitist interest group is incompatible with the se-
curity and legitimacy of the capitalist system of government. No
instrumentalist decision overstepped these bounds."' 9 An organic
conception of society avoids the particularism inherent in liberal
culture.
The way in which neutralist formalism and "consensus" instru-
mentalism disguise the partisan purposes and uses of law is an ex-
ample of the ideological function of law. In addition to its two
more obvious tasks-the repressive function, exemplified by the
criminal law and similar methods of "legitimately" exerting force,
and the facilitative function (overemphasized by Horwitz) of ren-
dering matters easier for the elites-"law must discipline the rul-
ing class and guide and educate the masses."1 10 Discipline becomes
necessary because the ruling class is fractured and divided against
itself, and its overall interests do not always coincide with the
168. Id. at 12; accord, Gilmore, supra note 9, at 797.
169. Cf. Bloomfield, supra note 9, at 1105.
170. E. GENOVESE, supra note 32, at 27.
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desires of this or that segment. (Law is not the only institutional
form used for such a purpose.) Perhaps the most important func-
tion of law is, however, educational and cooptative, to achieve for
the dominant elites what has become known as "hegemony." The
juridical system is one of the instruments "by which. . . the ruling
class imposes its viewpoint upon . . . the wider society."' 1
The ideology of the ruling class is not simply a falsification of
the facts; it is a distortion which focuses too narrowly and par-
tially, from an angle favorable to the elites. The supposedly neutral
or "consensus" nature of law is such a distortion, since law does
not represent a consensus of the interests of all in society; rather, it
represents the interests of some disguised as the interests of all. 1 2
The central relationship in capitalism, that of worker to capitalist,
also is distorted in such a fashion. The worker appears to sell her
labor-power freely to the capitalist, when in fact most workers
have no alternative other than to starve.11 3 "Freedom of contract"
is thus a way in which law is ideology.
A major criticism of Transformation, and of Marxist scholarship
in general, has noted a focus on the facilitative function of law, to
the exclusion of consideration of its ideological function. Horwitz
has provided evidence for this criticism by arguing forcefully that
the effect of instrumental decisions was redistributive. Charles
McClain, for example, notes that Horwitz has failed to show the
redistributive effects. 17 4 Stewart Macauley, in the same vein, has
for years been documenting the argument that the fundamental
rules of contract law are essentially irrelevant to the conduct of
capitalist business. 17 5 Robert Gordon helps to redirect the focus:
Morton Horwitz' much-criticized thesis that 19th century judges
fiddled the liability rules in part to help transportation and in-
dustrial enterprises externalize their costs ... seems to me per-
fectly correct if taken as a proposition about judicial ideology:
it's what the judges repeatedly said they wanted to do. Whether
171. Id. See also M. TUSHNTr, supra note 143.
172. See K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 64-68 (Int'l Pub. ed. 1970) (writ-
ten in 1845-46).
173. See generally Mensch, supra note 52, at 767 n.43.
174. McClain, supra note 9, at 394-95.
175. Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. RE v. 55 (1963).
[Vol. 23:663
LEGAL HISTORY TRANSFORMATION
the rules had any such effect is a totally different question, not
resolvable by doctrinal history and possibly not resolvable at
all.176
Although it is likely that contract and liability law were in fact
more facilitative than Macauley and Gordon give them credit for,
an organic perspective on law in capitalist society would not fail to
take into account law's ideological function. Mark Tushnet has an-
alyzed the ways in which law serves such a function: first, he says,
[L]egal doctrines appear as evidence of the dominant conscious-
ness, which by justifying the institutions of a society to its mem-
bers serves to support those institutions .... A coherent body
of doctrine may [also] demonstrate [to lawyers] how rules of law
that in fact perpetuate domination are nonetheless consistent
with [important ethical] traditions . .. [Finally,] legal doctrine
may serve to reconcile people in the wider society to the condi-
tions of their existence .... [T]he details of doctrine. . . derive
from fundamental structures of legal thought which penetrate
society and help justify its arrangements. 7
In other words, the apparent economic relations in society are rein-
forced by laws that appear to be based upon them; as social insti-
tutions with the appearance of fairness and common consent, and
as the only apparent legitimate social ordering devices, the laws
are persuasive and useful. Private law was supremely ideological in
establishing social tone, social boundaries, and a pattern for belief
in the way things were supposed to be.
Horwitz has overlooked the ideological significance of constitu-
tional law by his refusal to include it within his purview. The ide-
ology of constitutionalism was crucial to "acceptance" of the new
private-law doctrines by many whose real interests in fact con-
flicted with those of the entrepreneurs, and was thus essential to
the creation of the appearance of a social consensus. A major, per-
haps the major, means of reconciliation with and indoctrination of
the lower orders by the leaders of society after their triumphs in
176. Gordon, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. RE V. 903, 907 n.17 (1981).
177. Tushnet, supra note 8, at 98-100; cf. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An
Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'y REv. 571 (1977); B. OLLMAN,
ALmENATION, supra note 16, at 196-98; 1 K. Mn, CAPrrAL, supra note 23, at 71-83; 3 id. at
831.
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the Revolution and in the Constitutional Convention was the diffu-
sion throughout American culture of the liberal-democratic ideol-
ogy of fundamental rights and principles. The notion of govern-
ment under a rule of law always has been a powerful civilizing
factor,178 and now it was coupled with the appearance, and with
more than a little of the reality, of civil freedom guaranteed by
open, debated, fundamental public documents which apparently
severely limited governmental power and gave much of the popu-
lace the apparent power to have some effect upon that
government.
Whether or not these were real advances, and I am inclined to
conclude that despite the many shortcomings and failures of bour-
geois democracy exhibited from the outset 79 the changes had
much that was progressive about them,1 80 the ideological nature of
law made them appear to be very real. Many people came to be-
lieve that they had won a large measure of individual and collec-
tive freedom by independence from Great Britain and by the es-
tablishment of democratic government under law, and American
governments and much of the elite went to enormous lengths to
reinforce those beliefs. 81
As a result, the new government became "legitimate," and the
culture of entrepreneurial capitalism became the ethos of Ameri-
can democracy, excluding and crushing all competing visions of
democratic life. Genovese accurately concludes that "with the legal
system rooted in an ostensibly democratic polity, [a challenge to
established authority] had the poorest possible prospects." '182
178. See E. THOMPSON, supra note 138, at 258-69 (1975); Holt, supra note 108.
179. See, e.g., L. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CiVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963); R. EL-
LIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971).
180. Accord, Tushnet, supra note 136, at 1350.
181. E. GENOVESE, supra note 32, at 608; Genovese, supra note 8, at 735.
182. Genovese, supra note 8, at 735-36. Perhaps Genovese expects both a too well articu-
lated class consciousness and a too modern tone and substance for contemporaneously-held
concepts of the solutions to economic difficulties when he also concludes that "even [nine-
teenth-century] workers and farmers (at least the increasing portion oriented toward the
market) accepted a developmental perspective while having as yet no model of their own."
Id. at 736. Marx predicted that most preproletarian classes, and especially peasants and the
petty bourgeoisie, would be conservative in their protest goals, and that a full class con-
sciousness on the part of the oppressed could only occur under the conditions of fully devel-
oped capitalism:
The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan,
[Vol. 23:663714
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Many protests by dissident elements within American society were
made, but they were weak, diffuse, unsuccessful, and ignored. The
hegemony of constitutional ideology helped to diffuse and
destabilize social protest, making possible widespread acceptance
of judicial instrumentalism and lawyerly elitism, and ensuring ac-
ceptance of the changes in substantive law which Horwitz details.
C. Determinism
The tendency in liberal historiography toward determinism has
already been noted.1 3 An unsophisticated linear notion of cause-
and-effect relationships expects direct connections at all points be-
tween economics or economic interests and events or ideology,
rather than the complicated analysis involving multiple interac-
tions between material "structure" and political, psychological, and
other "superstructure" elements which Marx actually used.
When dealing with real situations, Marx does not offer the de-
velopment of technology or any other version of the economic
factor as self-generating, but as the result of a cluster of factors
coming from every walk of life and from every level of social
analysis. Likewise, when concerned with actual events, Marx
does not treat political and cultural progress as an automatic re-
sponse to changes in technology; his explanation is invariably
complex, and it is not always economic factors which play the
leading role.184
Such a sophisticated methodology is to be expected from the or-
ganic nature of capitalism and the holistic dialectic which Marx
used to understand and describe it, points which were not appar-
ent to many early Marxists, sparking a "structure"-"superstruc-
ture" debate which endures. 185
Throughout Transformation Horwitz unfortunately emphasizes
the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction
their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolu-
tionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll
back the wheel of history.
K. MARx & F. ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 19 (Int'l Pub. ed. New York 1948) (1st
ed. 1848).
183. See notes 50-56 & accompanying text supra.
184. B. OLLmAN, ALIENATION, supra note 16, at 8.
185. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
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the primacy of economics and economic motivations in the narrow,
liberal sense, and both radicals18" and liberals such as Bloomfield
have noted his determinism:
[Horwitz] never makes clear, for example, why judges favored
one entrepreneurial group over another, or what kind of special
relationship existed between the bench and the marketplace. At
times he posits an effective collaboration between elite lawyers,
big businessmen, and sympathetic judges. At other times he
credits judges alone with anticipating economic trends, and oc-
casionally he identifies legal change with the workings of an im-
personal Zeitgeist.187
We still need a description of the mechanics of legal change in
nineteenth-century America which will demonstrate that all three,
and more, of these mechanisms or linkages were operative, and will
explain why each type of linkage was appropriate in certain in-
stances. Struggle existed both within the elites and between clas-
ses; history, tradition, custom, precedent-all the ways that results
of past stiuggles have persisted-played important parts; entrepre-
neurs themselves likely attempted to influence the outcome of
some litigation; and we need to know much more about the social
backgrounds and interactions of specific lawyers, judges, and other
legal actors.' 88 These categories represent different kinds of
linkage.
The modes of the expression of economic interests are many, va-
ried, and constantly interacting. To understand history requires
that the variety of linkage mechanisms be explained, especially so
that "economics" comes to be understood, not as a concatenation
of impersonal forces that emanate mysteriously from goods,
money, greed, and the invisible hand, but as the extensive variety
of ways in which humans in social, work-related groups attempt
through interaction to satisfy their needs and desires, plus the
ways in which those interactions (including the reified remains of
186. See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 105-07; Genovese, supra note 8, at 729.
187. Bloomfield, supra note 9, at 1105. This criticism has been made, although somewhat
less elegantly, by many of those who have reviewed Transformation from the right. See, e.g.,
Winship, supra note 9, at 755.
188. On this last point see K. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (1979), which is reviewed by
Konefsky, On the Early History of Lower Federal Courts, Judges, and the Rule of Law, 79
MICH. L. REV. 645 (1981). See also Mensch, supra note 52, at 757 n.10.
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past interactions 89) act as boundaries or limits to each other.190
D. Class and Class Struggle
The most important weakness in Transformation is Horwitz's
narrow and limited formulation of class and class conflict. He has
demonstrated a willingness to write history in terms of a struggle
between business or commercial interests, on the one hand, and a
vaguely defined group of losers, on the other, and he presents some
good evidence thereof. Horwitz does not, however, exhibit a rigor-
ous theoretical grasp of the nature of the struggles or even of the
participants therein. At times it appears that the groups engaged
in conflict were self-defining; at times, the groups seem to be de-
fined by their occupations; at times there is a liberal concept of
classes as defined by social position or status; and finally it some-
times appears that membership in the groups depended upon the
outcome of phases of the struggles. Transformation can be put
down or dismissed as hokery on grounds that Horwitz has failed to
define the winners and the losers in the battles he depicts, and it
has been.191
Materialists understand "class" to refer to the way in which
groups of people, within a given mode of production, have access to
the means of production. In an emerging capitalist society there
are two primary ways in which persons can be so described: labor-
ers, who must sell their labor-power and have no real access, and
capitalists, who buy labor-power to extract surplus value therefrom
and have control of the access. There may be subsidiary classes,
most notably peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, who have been
created by a previous mode of production and who are in the pro-
189. See K. MARX, EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE, supra note 159, passim, esp. 15-18; E.
WRIGHT, supra note 17.
190. [W]hen a Marxist analyzes a particular event or ... specific doctrines, he or
she must not pretend that the structural determinants of a dominant ideology
operate directly to produce those doctrines [or the event]. Rather, transient
political forces, the influences of intermediary groups, and the need ... to
present law as a neutral force, all intervene to produce what has come to be
called a specific conjecture inserted into the general structure of capitalist
society.
Tushnet, supra note 136, at 1348.
191. Presser, supra note 4, at 719-24; Reid, supra note 3, at 1318-20; Scheiber, supra note
9, at 463-64.
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cess of being dissolved by the forces of capitalism into the working
class. If one focuses more closely, each of the two main classes is
fractured into lesser groups. Struggle is the definition of the rela-
tionship between the two central classes in capitalism because of
their inherent mutual antagonism over access to the means of pro-
duction. It is not merely a sometime thing involving a few visible
battles spread over time, after each of which genuine harmony
prevails-although, in large part due to the mystification generated
by capitalism and in no small part due to powerlessness of the
workers, open and violent conflict breaks out only from time to
time. "Class" and "struggle" are thus terms descriptive of eco-
nomic relationships. Categories of kinship or occupation or social
status are not determinative of membership in a class (though each
is important).
Horwitz variously identifies the winners as entrepreneurs, com-
mercial interests, or businessmen, rather than as capitalists. At
points he talks about struggles within this group, for instance be-
tween speculators and improvers of land,"9 2 or between business
enterprises and their insurors,193 but Horwitz has no theoretically
clear position that, although the elite has a single interest in main-
taining its dominance over the lower classes, antagonism between
various groups inside the elite is naturally a part of the war of all
against all for a bigger share of the market. His imprecision allows
his critics to conclude that occupational fluidity, a characteristic of
the nineteenth century, contradicts any assertion of the existence
of a single ruling class. The liberal critics also can define the in-
surors to be underdogs (rather than capitalists), since they had less
power than the entrepreneurs they insured, which, since they ap-
parently won their battle, means that the "ruling class" did not
always come out ahead.'
Whether it is useful to view the ruling class as a whole or as an
externally united set of internally warring interests depends upon
the purposes of the inquiry and the level of abstraction. Marx in
Capital, and Marx and Engels in the Manifesto, generally took the
broadest analytical perspective, discupsing social struggle at the
192. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 61 & n.153.
193. Id. at 154, 228-29.
194. See Reid, supra note 3, at 1318; Presser, supra note 4, at 723.
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level of capital versus labor; but in The Eighteenth Brumaire,
Marx focused in much more closely upon class struggle in France
during the period 1848-1852 and made clear his understanding
that many different factions and interests made up the ruling
class. 195 Erik Olin Wright has recently emphasized the necessity of
understanding whether one is utilizing the analytical level of "capi-
tal in general" or that of "many capitals."' 96 Genovese accurately
notes that Transformation is primarily a description of "a struggle
within the bourgeoisie and only secondarily between the bourgeoi-
sie as a whole and other classes.' 197 Use of Wright's suggested ana-
lytical level of "many capitals" would have sharpened the descrip-
tion while avoiding giving the impression that the volume deals
primarily with the conflict between capital and labor. Theoretical
rigor also would have prevented Horwitz from seeming to describe
history in terms of clashes between discrete interest groups, whose
membership is fluid and who shift positions and opponents easily.
Class forces are not interest groups, but are intricately and inti-
mately related both in internal struggle and in interclass struggle.
The relations and the struggle need to be depicted plainly in order
that the nature of the winners can be delineated.
More important is Horwitz's failure to tell us who the losers
were. The book appears, to many liberal critics, to have been an
attempt to accomplish just that, but in fact throughout Horwitz
pays little attention to those who presumably paid the price of de-
velopment and whose interests did not in fact coincide with the
emerging liberal "consensus." At one point he notes "strong ele-
ments in American society opposed to the expanding values of a
market economy" who reflected "a still dominant precommercial
consciousness of rural and religious America."' 98 At another point
he concludes that "the legal system had been reshaped. . . at the
expense of farmers, workers, consumers, and other less powerful
groups within the society."' 9  At still others he notes how those
195. K. MARX, EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE, supra note 159, at 23, 27-28, 36-37, 46-48, 90, 95,
102-03, 107, 122.
196. E. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 122 & n.13. See also id. at 48 n.37, 73 n.66, 188 n.13.
197. Genovese, supra note 8, at 732.
198. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 211.
199. Id. at 253-54.
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with land-the gentry-lost much ground to the entrepreneurs.0
Horwitz has lumped together groups that ought to remain analyti-
cally separate: the old winners (gentry), those outside the immedi-
ate mainstream of growth who must still have suffered (farmers,
shopkeepers), and those who were most intimately involved in the
rapid changes in the organization of production (workers, artisans,
immigrants, consumers).
As Genovese and Scheiber note, much more attention should
have been paid by Horwitz to the political battles of the period. 1
Who opposed corporations, and why? Who advocated more taxa-
tion, and why? What about protests specifically raised by workers,
or slaves, or rural elements? What sorts of changes occurred after
important economic events such as the Panic of 1837, and why? To
what extent were regional conditions important? What sorts of al-
liances did various lower segments of American society form, with
each other-and with elite groups, and why?
We need to know who really lost what during the emergence of
entrepreneurial capitalism, if only to still the insensitive and up-
per-class-oriented arguments of liberals who persist in asserting
that some groups got a "free ride" (that is, they supposedly re-
ceived benefits they were contemporaneously unaware of, which
presumably cancelled out burdens they were aware of°20 ), or that
the losers were always the immoral, the lazy, and the undeserv-
ing,2"' or that, because of occupational fluidity and the trickle-
down effect of emerging abundance, nobody really lost.20 4 It is
likely that such studies collectively will show that real wages and
income diminished for many American workers and that degrading
working conditions increased; that concomitant ills beset other
lower segments of northern and western American society (as
Genovese has demonstrated for slaves in the South20 5); that, in
short, proletarian-like conditions began to emerge for many, all
concomitant with (if not directly caused by) the changes in sub-
stantive law detailed in Transformation. Horwitz's history unfor-
200. Id. at 140-41, 146.
201. Genovese, supra note 8, at 734-36; Scheiber, supra note 9, at 463-64.
202. See Presser, supra note 4, at 721.
203. See Reid, supra note 3, at 1317.
204. See Presser, supra note 4, at 722.
205. E. GENOVESE, supra note 32, and other works by Genovese.
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tunately does not tell us much about the losers, and by its obscu-
rity in use of loose liberal interest-group characterization it can
reinforce a notion that nothing was really lost.
Case law is likely to have little to do directly with workers or
their conditions, but Horwitz omits most areas of law which did
take the interests of workers into account. A three-page discussion
of "the application of the will theory of contract to labor con-
tracts"20 6 adverts to a branch of the law that must have been di-
rectly important to working class interests, but beyond the nota-
tion that certain doctrinal inconsistencies in early labor law "seem
• . . to be an important example of class bias, 20 7 the investigation
is disappointingly legalistic, doctrinal, and free from overtones of
economic consequences. The focus of most of the book is from the
top down, concerned with the ways in which elite tools were used
during elite interactions to serve essentially elite purposes.
A central example concerns the alternative to unbridled eco-
nomic growth: Horwitz uses the term "redistribution" without
elaboration of other social changes that would inevitably be en-
tailed.208 Deterministic-that is, it assumes that the "mere" rear-
rangement of social wealth-holding would have solved the most
pressing and difficult of social problems-the term "redistribution"
connotes a focus on narrowly defined "economic" interests rather
than humane ones, seeming to ignore the difficulty of achieving a
systemic solution which would eliminate social oppression. The
real interests of those who attempted to refuse to go along with the
nineteenth-century ethos of capitalism lay in achieving an entirely
different egalitarian ethos emphasizing genuine freedom and social
cooperation, 209 and did not stop abruptly at demands for a larger
206. M. HoRwITz, supra note 1, at 186; see id. at 186-88.
207. Id. at 188.
208. Id. at 66, 101, 255.
209. [T]he realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is determined
by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of
things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the sav-
age must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce
life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and
under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of
physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the
forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this
field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally
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or more equal share of the pie. What the upper classes feared was
"redistribution."
By focusing on elites, Transformation subliminally reinforces
the view we are supposed to have that only the rich, the powerful,
and the important are crucial or interesting. It admits of the possi-
bility of class struggle but then shies away from the ways in which
legal interactions might have demonstrated the ugly reality of class
conflict and class bias. To Horwitz's gentleness, compassion, and
outrage-to his break with the liberals-must be added the
strength of a materialist analysis of history. Horwitz's story must
be taken further, expanded, drawn from the standpoint of the
losers; succeeding works in radical legal history must deal with
class and class struggle.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite its shortcomings, which can be remedied by Marxist his-
toriography, Transformation stands as a monumental achieve-
ment. Bourgeois historians and bourgeois historiography have been
demonstrated to be what they are, biased and partial rather than
neutral and timeless. The "consensus" assumptions underpinning
all schools of mainstream American legal history have been shown
to be partisan, and partisan from the standpoint of the elite. The
way has been cleared for legal historians to place the focus where it
belongs, on socioeconomic evidence of class conflict. Law now will
be viewed as an element of praxis, that is, meaning-creating
human activity.21 Also, since law is a fundamental ideological phe-
nomenon,2" important contributions to the "structure"-"super-
structure" debate can be expected, aiding the resolution of central
Marxist theoretical problems as we continue to come to grips with
regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common con-
trol, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving
this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable
to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nevertheless still remains a realm
of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an
end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only
with this realm of necessity as its basis.
3 K. MARx, CAPrrL, supra note 23, at 820.
210. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
211. See note 14 supra.
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our rejection of the bourgeois radical disjunction between subject
and object, between consciousness and actuality, and as we con-
tinue to develop a socialist culture.
